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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
An important component of globalization since the 2000s is the increased participation 
of developing economies in the global economy (Buckley et al., 2007b; Yiu, Lau, & 
Bruton, 2007). Specifically, Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) have gained 
significant attention recently. Despite the significance of Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) in recent years, the conditions prompting decision makers to take 
OFDI are not well understood. Previous studies analyze the determinants of Chinese 
OFDI majorly from three perspectives: the resource-based view (Liang, Lu, & Wang, 
2012; Lu, Liu, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2014; Yiu et al., 2007), institutional factors in 
both home and host countries  (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012b), and 
industry factors (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Boateng, 2012a). However, I propose that 
a theory of OFDI must include the factors that motivate decision makers to pursue 
significant changes in corporate activities. The perspective of managers situated within 
firms and what motivates them to initiate deliberations and search that eventuate in 
OFDI worth further analysis. Moreover, the outcome of Chinese firms’ 
internationalization is still unclear. Instead of measuring its effect on firms’ 
performance directly, I will examine the effect of Chinese firms’ OFDI on their 
innovation outputs in the home country as strategic asset seeking is one of the major 
targets for their foreign expansion.  
Attention to aspiration and their effect on organizational change are the key 
component in the behavioral theory of the firm (Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & March, 
1963; Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; March & Shapira, 1987; March & Shapira, 
1992; Ocasio, 1997). Based on Cyert and March (1963) behavioral theory of the firm, 
previous literature offers strategic and behavioral explanations for those factors that 
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induce or impel organizations to compete and excel in evolving competitive landscapes. 
Previous literature use behavioral theory of the firm to explain if firms would form non-
local ties (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005a), to engage in R&D investment 
(Chen, Kuo-Hsien, & Tsai, 2007; Greve, 2003a; Nohria & Gulati, 1996), to select 
partner of equal or different status (Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011), and to carry out 
acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008), and to introduce new production (Gaba & Joseph, 
2013; Tyler & Caner, 2016). In spite of this extensive research, few scholars have used 
the behavioral theory of the firm to explain a firm’s internationalization decisions 
especially for firms from emerging market. Internationalization has the potential to 
transform organizations and increase firms’ competitive advantages, but they are also 
fraught with uncertainty. The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) 
offers an excellent platform for decision-making ideas of internationalization as 
undertaking international expansion is a form of organizational search. It emphasizes 
the organizational processes of performance evaluation, search, and decision making, 
and leads to propositions concerning how these affect organizational changes. This 
theory provides my starting point for theorizing about the determinants of 
organizational search and change---internationalization.  
 Luo and Tung (2007) suggest that different from advanced market multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) which generally leverage and exploit their ownership-specific 
competitive advantages in foreign countries (Dunning, 1981), emerging market MNEs 
systematically and recursively use international expansion to acquire critical resources 
needed to compete more efficiently against global rivals in their home country market. 
To most Chinese MNEs, their home country markets are still their primary territory of 
operation (Luo & Tung, 2007). Hence, international expansion is not an end to most 
Chinese MNEs’ success. How to leverage core competences at home and channel back 
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their strategic assets and capabilities back to their home country is the next target after 
their foreign expansion. Accordingly, this dissertation attempts to contribute to the 
literature by investigating the effects of OFDI in developed countries on their 
innovation in the home country.  
This dissertation is undertaken to advance the understanding of how performance 
relative to aspirations influences firms’ OFDI decisions and consequently the firm 
innovation in the home country. It contributes to the understanding of firms’ foreign 
expansion, and the question regarding internationalization influence on firm innovation.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
In this dissertation, I attempt to investigate the following two research questions:  
1) How does firms’ performance relative to aspirations affect the extent of their OFDI? 
2) How does firms’ OFDI influence their innovation output?  
 Figure 1 presents the broad overview of the above research questions. Following 
the figure, I give a summary of each of the two research questions.  















relative to aspiration 
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1.2.1 Essay 1 
Cyert and March (1963) highlighted two key stimuli for search---problems and slack. 
Problemistic search is an effort to identify alternatives to current activities that resolve 
performance shortfalls. Slack search occurs when firms possess excess resources that 
allow for experimentation, which can help firms identify and pursue new opportunities 
(Levinthal & March, 1981). In the first essay, I investigate behavioral explanations for 
the Chinese firms’ OFDI by focusing on the factors of performance relative to aspiration 
and extend the model of decision making to a competitive context to develop a theory 
about how foreign competition in domestic markets affects firms’ decision making.  
Drawing on behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), I argue that firms’ 
performance relative to their aspirations will influence their incentives and capabilities 
to take investment, and thus their decisions of internationalization. For firms 
performing above aspirations, I propose that the extent of firms’ outward FDI increases 
following slack search argument. For firms performing below aspirations, outward FDI 
was not their matched solution for performance problem which is not consistent with 
the problemistic search.  
However, foreign competition increases their probability to do the problemistic 
search through OFDI by affecting their resource allocation and focus of attention. 
Managers in firms in industries with higher foreign competitions seek to balance their 
situation by developing foreign market opportunities and relocating their limited 
resources to foreign markets with higher profitability. Meanwhile, these firms may draw 
on the experience of foreign firms when selecting the responses to a given performance 
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problem, which in turn increase their probability to do the problemistic search to 
undertake OFDI. Although competition plays a significant role in the behavioral theory 
of the firm, not much research in this tradition has analyzed the role of competition in 
the formation of performance aspirations and focus of attention. In the first essay, I 
extend the models’ application to organizations’ decision making in their OFDI and 
examines a contingency effect of foreign competition on these predictions.  
  
1.2.2 Essay 2 
Following the first essay that analyzes the antecedent of firms’ OFDI from the 
behavioral theory of the firm perspective, I explore the outcome of firms’ OFDI with a 
particular focus on their innovation output in the second essay. This study begins with 
the observation that Chinese MNEs, as latecomers to international business, are largely 
in the stage of catching up with developed market MNEs in technological capabilities 
to be internationally competitive (Mudambi, 2008). Chinese MNEs, therefore, seeking 
to move from a focus on lower value-added activities, such as standardized 
manufacturing and services, to higher value-added activities based on R&D (Mudambi, 
2008). Chinese firms can improve their technological capabilities by learning and 
absorbing advanced technological knowledge possessed by companies in developed 
markets (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mudambi, 2008). Thus, 
following this line of argument, Chinese firms’ OFDI could improve their innovation 
output in their home market.  
Previous literature proposed two primary reasons for the massive increase in 
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Chinese firms’ innovation, provincial-level subsidy program and a huge amount of FDI 
in China (spillover effect). In equity joint ventures (JVs) in China, foreign partners are 
often concerned about the potential for opportunism by their Chinese partners who 
develop capabilities through alliances that can be used later to compete against them 
not only in China, but also in the global marketplace (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2004). 
As many foreign firms with superior technology are reluctant to transfer their superior 
technology, JVs in China do not appear to build Chinese proprietary knowledge (Nolan, 
2001). Since inward FDI and particularly JVs cannot bring in some types of strategic 
assets, outward FDI becomes a logical option to fill these resource gaps. Consequently, 
in the second essay, I explore the effects of firms’ internationalization on their 
innovation output and the contingency effects of performance aspirations and industry 
competition. Specifically, I propose that outward FDI in developed market improve 
firms’ innovation output in their home country. Also, performance below aspiration 
level alleviates the benefits of OFDI on innovation, and industry competition strength 
the effects of OFDI on innovation. 
 
1.3 Contribution   
I sought to make several major contributions in the following perspectives. First, the 
behavioral theory of the firm provides a unique lens to study firms’ internationalization. 
My intention is that a theory of OFDI must include the factors that motivate managers 
to pursue significant changes in corporate activities. To address this issue, one needs to 
understand the perspective of managers situated within firms and what motivates them 
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to initiate deliberations and search that eventuate in OFDI. Hence, I propose a 
behavioral explanation for the OFDI decisions.  
Second, I extend the decision-making model to a competitive context. This 
extension draws attention to firms performing above or below aspiration level 
differences when they face foreign competitions in domestic markets. Foreign 
competition persuades companies to take the foreign expansion. More specifically, as 
foreign competition influences firms’ resource allocation and focus of attention, it has 
a stronger effect for firms performing below aspirations.  
Third, although the behavioral theory of the firm is an important way to analyze 
firms’ decision making, to date, it has rarely been examined in the context of emerging 
markets. To advance this perspective, I investigate OFDI decisions of Chinese listed 
firms as China provides a suitable platform for exploring the relationships I outlined 
because it is an attractive destination for foreign firms, which helps me analyzed the 
foreign competition effects. Moreover, Chinese firms are increasingly taking part in 
outward FDI in recent years. This empirical setting provides us an efficient way to 
understand the emerging phenomenon (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009) 
which, in turn, helps advance the theory.  
Fourth, this dissertation tries to contribute to learning theory and innovation 
literature and proposes that different from inward FDI as a passive learning model, 
outward FDI to developed countries could be an active learning process especially for 
emerging market MNEs to access resources in foreign markets. Moreover, this study 
further figures out that the effect of outward FDI on innovation depends on their 
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performance relative to aspirations, and industry competition. In some circumstances, 
an OFDI project is an efficient way for firms to access a broad range of external 
resources that is quite hard to access through market transactions. Moreover, the 
following learning-by-doing practices could help them to internalize the external 
resources in a complete manner.  
Finally, this study contributes to the empirical analysis of innovation research in 
China. The existing literature on innovation and patenting issue in China is limited. 
Even though there is some studies at the aggregate, industry, and province level, firm 
level analysis is seldom. I construct a novel firm-level dataset that combines listed firms’ 
internationalization and patent data between 2002 and 2010 and analyzes the effects of 
Chinese firms’ internationalization on their innovation output.  
 
1.4 Outline 
I organize my thesis as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the behavioral theory 
of the firm, Chinese firms’ OFDI, and firms’ innovation respectively. Chapter 3 
introduces the empirical context of this dissertation: Chinese listed firms’ 
internationalization and the patent system in China. In Chapter 4, I draw on behavioral 
theory of the firm to propose hypotheses regarding the effects of performance 
aspirations on the extent of firms’ internationalization. Chapter 5 addresses the second 
research question that analyzes the effects of firms’ OFDI on innovation. In Chapter 6, 
I summarize the major findings of the current studies and discuss contributions of the 
dissertation and each essay separately. Chapter 7 conclude the dissertation. 
15 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Drivers of outward FDI 
Previous studies examine the forces driving outward FDI of Chinese firms from 
following major perspectives: the resource-based view of the firm, resource-
dependency theory, institutional theory, and industrial organization economics. Table 1 
presents a summary of these studies. Much of the research on the international 
expansion of MNEs is rooted in the notion of firm-specific advantages (Hymer, 1976). 
This view posits that firms engage in the international expansion when they seek to 
leverage their firm-specific advantages in new settings.  
The resource-based view (RBV) asserts that resources that are valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and imperfectly substitutable are a company’s primary source of 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). It has recently guided inquiry into the 
antecedents of outward FDI (Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 2006; Hitt, 
Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, & McCullough, 2007; 
Tuppura, Saarenketo, Puumalainen, Jantunen, & Kyläheiko, 2008). As it focuses on 
differences in distinctive firm characteristics, RBV is a significant departure from Neo-
classical market-based theory on the industrial organization (Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992). Based on resource-based view, foreign expansion is an effective way to 
appropriate rents in foreign markets by exploring and exploiting valuable resources. 
Deploying resources that possessed by the firm in multiple foreign markets could help 
them balance the costs and risks incurred in overseas those originated from liability of 
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foreignness and greater managerial complexity (Tseng et al., 2007), and reach 
economies of scale (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). The RBV is compatible with 
mainstream conceptualizations of international expansion (Dunning, 1993), as 
ownership advantages are conceptually similar to the firm’s value-generating resources. 
As a result, some prevailing approaches to outward FDI such as resource-exploitation, 
asset-seeking, and knowledge sourcing rest upon the resource-based view.  
 By using a survey data of CEO over 3000 firms, Lau, Ngo, and Yiu (2010) propose 
that different resources endowments have a different relationship with 
internationalization decisions. Specifically, they discover that production, sales, 
operations and finance resources have a positive impact on Chinese OFDI. Moreover, 
Liang et al. (2012) report that resource endowment advantages of private enterprises 
compared with foreign-invested enterprises and the organizing capability advantages of 
private enterprises over state-owned enterprises (SOE) positively relate to a firm’s 
likelihood of outward internationalization. This finding supports the mainstream 
perspective and is consistent with the previous research of Yiu et al. (2007). Based on 
the knowledge-based view, Lu et al. (2014) propose that firms’ domestic industrial and 
regional diversification positively influence their international diversification. Also, top 
management team (TMT)’s previous international experience strengthens the 
relationship, whereas TMT’s prior political connections weaken the relationship. 
 However, firm-specific factors seem to be also related to institutional factors in 
determining firms’ internationalization. While the literature has paid lots of attention to 
host country institutions (Deng, 2009; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Meyer 
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& Sinani, 2009; Xia, Tan, & Tan, 2008), scholars begin to recognize that we should pay 
attention to home country institutions in exploring the internationalization of emerging 
market firms (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Luo & Tung, 
2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007). These findings thus promote an interest in probing the role 
played by home country institutions behind outward internationalization and propose 
two opposite views on this issue.  
 The “escape” view argues that outward FDI from emerging markets is in part an 
escape response to a burdensome home country institutional environment (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007). Because of the institutional constraints, 
some scholars propose that the primary motivation to go abroad for emerging market 
firms is to avoid the disadvantages incurred by home country institutions instead of 
leveraging their competitive advantages (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Child & Rodrigues, 
2005; Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). Luo and Tung (2007) identify the 
“pull factor” of emerging market MNEs that “use outward investment as a springboard 
to acquire strategic assets needed to compete more efficiently against global rivals and 
to avoid the institutional and market constraints they face at home.”  
 In contrast, the “fostering” view suggests a facilitating role of advanced institutions 
that promotes firms’ outward internationalization (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). From this 
perspective, firms do not necessarily react to institutional constraints, but strategically 
explore institutions as opportunities (Jonsson & Regnér, 2009). In other words, 
emerging market firms could utilize government intervention as a positive “push factor” 
behind their internationalization (Wang et al., 2012b). In the internationalization 
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process, government support could provide firms the privileged access to low-cost 
capital, subsidies, and raw materials, which are essential for their success in the foreign 
expansion. (Buckley et al., 2007b; Cui & Jiang, 2010; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Morck, 
Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). In addition to the home country institutions, scholars also 
analyze the institutions at the sub-national level. Sun, Peng, Lee, and Tan (2014) 
propose that greater institutional open access in a region of a home country leads to 
greater OFDI of local firms headquartered in that region. Further, the tenure of that 
region’s governor moderates such relationships in different ways. 
By integrating resource-based view and institutional theory, Wang et al. (2012b) 
suggest that government involvement influences the level of OFDI, although not all 
firms possess equal abilities to internalize government-related advantages. Huang and 
Renyong (2014) report that Chinese private firms are increasingly active in a market- 
and strategic asset-seeking OFDI because of the unfavorable environment they face at 
home and the different resources they possess. By integrating institutional theory and 
agency theory, Liu, Lu, and Chizema (2014) figure out that both of the top-executive 
cash pay and equity ownership are primary factors in affecting OFDI. Sub-national 
institutions positively moderate the governance role of managerial equity ownership. 
Also, Liang, Ren, and Sun (2015) report that both of the state ownership control and 
executives’ political connections affect firms’ globalization decisions. Moreover, these 
two factors are contingent upon the home country’s evolving institutional environments.  
Traditional industrial organization thinking emphasizes that the conditions such as 
entry barriers and competitive rivalry within a given industry affect a firm’s strategy 
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and performance (Porter, 1990). Furthermore, these conditions may shape the extent to 
which a firm is likely to achieve positional advantages. Building on this framework, 
one may suggest that a firm’s internationalization decisions are a result of the level of 
the competition in the industry in which the firm operates (Boter & Holmquist, 1996; 
Hymer, 1976). In other words, the firm may pursue foreign expansion to find new 
profitable opportunities facing the level of high competition within an industry (Yang, 
Jiang, Kang, & Ke, 2009). Xia, Ma, Lu, and Yiu (2014) explore that multiple forms of 
interdependence between Chinese and foreign firms in China such as symbiotic, 
competitive, and partner interdependencies positively affect the level of the Chinese 
firms’ OFDI activity. Moreover, state ownership negatively moderate these 
relationships. Additionally, rivalry-based theories of mimetic behavior suggest that 
competitors that operate in the same industry would influence a firm’s international 
expansion (Knickerbocker, 1973). 
 Except competitions, industries also differ in their globalization potential, 
technological opportunities, and policy, which may account for variations in OFDI 
across different industries. First, sectors that rely on a standardized product or service 
such as microchips and engine components have a higher degree of globalization 
compared to sectors that produce consumer products in which preferences are 
influenced by culture and other country-specific characteristics. Second, outward FDI 
is more pronounced in sectors with high technological opportunities as technological 
advances are renewed quickly in these industries (Klevorick et al., 1995). Third, 
industries that are experiencing rapid deregulation may persuade firms to take 
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internationalization. For example, in the telecommunications industry, the ongoing 
regulatory liberalization and privatization have made it much easier for firms to expand 
overseas through acquisitions. Overall, this discussion suggests that differences in the 
level of internationalization stem from variations in the characteristics of industries.  
From the industry perspective, Luo, Zhao, Wang, and Xi (2011) report that industry 
structure uncertainty and firm-specific advantages increase the level of Chinese OFDI. 
The interdependence between institutional, industry and firm-specific factors is more 
evidence in some papers that adopt the so-called strategy tripod perspective. Thus, Lu, 
Liu, and Wang (2010) suggest that supportive government policies are important 
motivators for both strategic asset- and market-seeking OFDI; however, firms’ 
technology advantages and R&D industry intensity tend to motivate strategic asset-
seeking OFDI, whereas firms’ export experience and high domestic industry 
competition tend to induce market-seeking OFDI. Wang et al. (2012a) report that 
government support and the industrial structure of the home country play a greater role 
than firms’ technological and advertising resources.  
However, these firm characteristics, industry, and institutional explanations cannot 
account for firms’ motivations from managers’ perspective in affecting their OFDI 
decisions. My contention is that the determinants of OFDI must include the factors that 
motivate managers in particular firms to pursue major changes in their corporate 
activities. Specifically, to address the determinant of OFDI, it is necessary to understand 
the perspective of managers situated within firms and what motivates them to initiate a 
search that eventuates in OFDI.
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Table 1: Drivers of Chinese firms’ OFDI 
Authors Theoretical 
perspective 






A survey data of CEO over 
3000 firms in the year 2000 
Different resources endowments have different relationships with 
internationalization decisions. The intention of going international is affected 






A survey data from CEOs of 
553 private enterprises in 
eight major cities spreading 
across the Pearl River Delta 
and Yangtze River Delta 
region 
Chinese firms’ likelihood of venturing abroad is associated with resource 
endowment advantages vis-à-vis foreign-invested enterprises, organizing 
capability advantages vis-à-vis state-owned enterprises, and organizing 








Chinese listed firms except 
financial firms during 2002-
2009 
International diversification is positively affected by firms’ domestic industrial 
and domestic regional diversification. Also, top management team (TMT)’s 
previous international experience strengthens the relationship, whereas TMT’s 









A firm-level dataset by 
matching firms from ARIES 
with OFDI information in 
MOC OFDI database in 2006 
and 2007 
Government involvement influences the level of overseas investment, its 








Interviews with senior 
managers of private 
enterprises in Zhejiang 
Chinese private enterprises are increasingly active in committing both markets- 
and strategic asset-seeking OFDI due to the unfavorable institutional 
environment they face in China and the different types of resources possessed.  




& Agency theory 
Chinese listed firms except 
financial firms during 2002-
2007 
Top-executive cash pay and equity ownership have a positive association with 
OFDI. Sub-national institutions within China positively moderate the 








& Agency theory 
Chinese listed firms except 
financial firms during 2001-
2011 
The diminishing impact of executives’ political connections and the increasing 
impact of state ownership control on firms’ degree of globalization demonstrate 
the evolving relationship between the state and the managers, as well as the 
dynamics of state control in globalizing SOEs. 
Sun, Peng, 
Lee, & Tan 
(2014) 
Institutional theory  Chinese listed firms except 
financial firms between 2001 
and 2005 
Greater institutional open access in a region of a home country leads to greater 
OFDI of local firms headquartered in that region. Further, tenure of that region’s 
governor moderates such relationships in different ways 








conducted by CASS and 
ACFIC in 2008 
Supportive government policies are important motivators for both strategic 
asset-seeking and market-seeking OFDI. Firms’ technology-based competitive 
advantages and a high level of industry R&D intensity tend to motivate strategic 
asset-seeking OFDI, whereas firm’s export experience and a higher level of 











A firm-level dataset by 
matching firms from ARIES 
with OFDI information in 
MOC OFDI database in 2006 
and 2007 
Government support and the industrial structure of the home country of the 
investing firms play a crucial role in OFDI. By contrast, technological and 
advertising resources tend to be less important.  
Xia, Ma, 




Chinese listed firms in 
manufacturing industries 
during 2000-2007 
The level of interdependence between Chinese and foreign firms in China in 
multiple forms, including symbiotic, competitive, and partner 
interdependencies, is positively associated with the level of the Chinese firms’ 
OFDI. However, Chinese firms with higher levels of state ownership are less 
susceptible to the pressures imposed by foreign firms to invest abroad. 
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2.2 A Behavioral Theory of the firm 
A central idea in learning theory---that organizations learn from their past performance, 
which conditions subsequent actions (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988) has 
led to an interest in how organizations’ performance affects the likelihood of different 
types of action (March, 1988; Miller & Chen, 1994; Ocasio, 1995). In the behavioral 
view, organizations are goal-directed systems that use simple decision heuristics to 
adapt behavior in response to performance feedback. In other words, performance 
relative to aspirations triggers an organizational search. Schneider (1992) described an 
aspiration level as the “smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the 
decision maker”.  
One important idea behind this research is that decision makers’ actions differ 
depending on whether their performance is above or below some goal or aspiration 
level relative to either their historical performance or social performance relative to 
their peers (Greve, 1998, 2003a; Greve, 2003b; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March & 
Shapira, 1992; Milliken & Lant, 1991). In other words, bounded rational decision 
makers use aspirations to determine the boundary between success and failure in 
continuous measures of performance (Fiegenbaum, Hart, & Schendel, 1996; Greve, 
2003b; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Decision makers appear to increase their 
emphasis on exploratory search and be more willing to engage in riskier behaviors with 
more uncertain outcomes (e.g. reorient strategies, change markets, introduce new 
practices and processes, raise R&D intensity, emphasize breakthrough innovations, 
launch products based on new technologies) when their performance differs from their 
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goal or aspiration level (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Greve, 1998, 2003a; Greve, 
2003b; Lant et al., 1992; Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 2002; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  
Models of aspiration performance are central to research on organizational and 
managerial risk taking (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 1998; Greve, 2003b; Lant, 1992; March 
& Shapira, 1992). Decision makers are more likely to engage in risky behavior when 
their organizations fail to attain or exceed a goal or aspiration level---a reference point 
that identifies the boundary between perceived success and failure (Cyert & March, 
1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March, 1988; March & Simon, 1958). Performance 
feedback models have proven influential in explaining managerial risk taking on a 
broad range of organizational actions. Based on the review of research on performance 
feedback models, Greve (2003b) concluded that performance relative to aspiration 
levels appears to serve as a “master switch” influencing risk taking across a wide range 
of organizational behaviors.  
When an organization is performing below aspirations, its decision-makers 
emphasize more-exploratory nonlocal search and larger changes with the potential to 
raise the organization’s performance closer to aspirations (Singh, 1986). Performance 
below aspirations triggers the problem-driven search, stimulating exploration of new 
practices and courses of action, with the extent of search and change depending on how 
far performance is below the aspiration point. Studies show that performance below 
aspirations leads to decision makers to initiate experimentation to identify new 
opportunities to solve their performance shortfalls. However, in empirical tests, the 
effects of changes in performance when performance falls below the aspiration level 
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remains subject to active debate (March & Shapira, 1992; Ocasio, 1995; Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992). 
 Greve (1998) find that decreases in performance increased the risk taking of firms 
below the aspiration level. Similarly, Ketchen and Palmer (1999) find that low 
performance increased organizational risk taking. Miller and Chen (2004) report that 
decreases in performance increased organizational risk taking in all ranges of 
performance. However, Miller and Bromiley (1990) find that deterioration in 
performance increased risk taking for high performers but decreased it for low 
performers. Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) find that lower performance caused less risk 
taking in a sample of declining firms. Moreover, Iyer and Miller (2008) explore that 
acquisition activity increases as performance rises among firms performing below 
aspiration. Gaba and Joseph (2013) propose that poor performance at different levels of 
the firm may not have uniform consequences for the behavior of business unit managers, 
a central driver of adaptive change. Based on the analysis on mobile device 
manufacturers for the period 2002-2008, they report that poor performance at the 
business unit level has a positive effect on new product introductions. In contrast, firms 
introduce less new product facing corporate-level performance problems (Gaba & 
Joseph, 2013). 
A substantial body of research suggests that performance far above aspirations also 
has an effect on risk taking. The performance feedback model suggests that 
organizations performing above their aspiration levels may engage in greater learning 
and change than those performing at or near their aspiration levels. This slack-driven 
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search prediction stem from the idea that performance above aspiration leads to 
nonlocal search, experimentation, and change because success provides organizational 
decision makers with access to resources and instills confidence in their abilities to 
pursue new initiatives (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1981; March & 
Shapira, 1992). Although some types of high performance may not create slack 
resources (Greve, 2003a), most types lower the cost of resources (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986). 
 Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and You-Ta (2005b) report that slack-driven search may 
increase the tendency of decision makers to initiate risky nonlocal partnerships in the 
hope of even greater gain based on Canadian investment banks from 1952 to 1990. By 
analyzing US Class 1 freight railroads’ accident costs from 1975 to 2001, Baum and 
Dahlin (2007) find that when performance exceed and away from aspirations stimulates 
nonlocal search and exploration. An exception is Greve (1998), who predicted that 
performance above aspirations would lead to complacency and less risk taking in his 
study of radio stations. He noted, however, that his prediction and supportive findings 
were likely to be particular to the product-market decision he examined. Product-market 
strategies are unlikely to be susceptible to change when organizational performance is 
above aspirations because such an action would entail abandoning the strategy that 
generated the performance in the first place. Unlike changing product-market strategies 
when performance is above aspirations, taking on new nonlocal partners, investing in 
R&D and other strategies does not preclude organizations that are performing above 
aspirations from their previous strategies (Baum et al., 2005b).  
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In recent years, the application of the behavioral theory of the firm expands to a 
broader context and in more detailed analysis. Based on Jeopardy, the TV game show 
in 1990 and 2001, Boyle and Shapira (2012) figure out leaders focus on their aspiration 
point, whereas followers’ focus of attention shifts between their aspiration and survival 
points. Also, leaders are prone to take excessive risks to maintain their leadership 
position. Blettner, He, Hu, and Bettis (2015) report organizations pay more attention on 
their aspirations when early in their life cycle. However, they tend to focus more on 
their competitors’ performance when at the verge of bankruptcy. Kim, Finkelstein, and 
Haleblian (2015) posit that historical and social aspirations, in fact, lead to dissimilar 
firm behavior. In the context of merge and acquisitions within the US commercial 
banking industry from 1988 to 2005, they find that firms’ acquisition behavior varies 
significantly depending on whether historical or social comparisons are used.  
Cyert and March’s seminal behavioral theory is one of the two major economics-
based theories of the firm that goes inside the “black box” (of the firm) ---the other 
being the contribution of Edith Penrose, or subsequently developments in the resource-
based view (Pitelis, 2007). Both of these theories share the idea that firms are proactive 
organizations, that any examination of the firm requires looking at inside the firm, that 
firms read the external environment through an organizational filter, and that as a result 
there exists imperfect environmental matching. Both theories rely on uncertainty, 
limited rationality, and learning. By integrating the behavioral theory of the firm and 
the resource-based view, this dissertation tries to provide a more comprehensive picture 
on firms’ decision making.  
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2.3 Outward FDI and Innovation  
2.3.1 Limitations of the inward FDI learning model 
Considerable attention to date has been paid to China as a host country for 
internationally expanding investing firms (Huang, 2003). This is understandable in the 
light of the fact that China has absorbed massive amounts of inward foreign direct 
investment, and is the world’s largest recipient of such investment (UNCTAD, 2013). 
Some may wonder why Chinese firms with strong catch-up strategies are not taking 
advantage of huge inward FDI and particularly equity joint ventures in China to source 
strategic assets. Indeed, literature has documented that Chinese firms have benefited 
substantially from inward FDI and especially equity JVs that were originally intended 
to serve the Chinese domestic market (Li, Chen, & Shapiro, 2013; Luo, 2004). These 
so-called ‘spillovers’ are defined as positive externalities that benefit domestic firms 
with the presence of FDI, which can result in productivity increases among local firms 
(Blomstrom, 1986; Caves, 1974; Spencer, 2008).  
From a managerial perspective, JVs may be the most efficient vehicle with which 
to transfer tacit knowledge and hence makes more sense from the standpoint of a player 
who needs to catch up (Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001). Moreover, inward investment has 
deepened Chinese firms’ understanding of international markets and helped them 
accumulate international experience and considerable financial and operational assets. 
Building on their unique capabilities and learning experience with inward FDI, Chinese 
firms are most likely to accelerate their subsequent outward FDI and increase their 
commitment to international markets (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
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  Previous studies have produced mixed findings on FDI spillovers in emerging 
market. Some studies have found evidence of positive spillover effects from FDI to 
emerging market firms (Blomstrom, 1986; Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002, 2007a; 
Sinani & Meyer, 2004; Tian, 2007; Wei & Liu, 2006). In contrast, other studies have 
found no evidence (Haddad & Harrison, 1993) or contradictory evidence(Aitken & 
Harrison, 1999; Konings, 2001), of technology spillovers from multinationals to local 
firms. In recent years, Chang and Xu (2008) further proposed that increased presence 
of foreign firms could increase survival rates of local firms nationally, but decrease their 
survival rates of local firms in regional markets. Zhang, Li, Li, and Zhou (2010) 
proposed that the diversity of FDI country origins can facilitate FDI spillovers. 
Innovation clusters of inward FDI and exporting activities, serving as foreign 
knowledge access channels, foster innovative capabilities of firms in emerging markets 
(Li, Chen, & Shapiro, 2010). Li et al. (2013) using more than 346000 Chinese 
manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2006 find that concentrated foreign innovative 
activities in the industry have a positive effect on Chinese firms’ product innovation. 
However, as foreign presence increase to a certain level, the spillover benefits decrease 
quickly and then replaced by the crowding-out effect. Meanwhile, inter-industry 
spillover effect also existed in a city. The diversity of industries with a foreign presence 
also improves Chinese firms’ product innovation.  
Emerging market enterprises have benefited tremendously from inward FDI (Luo 
& Tung, 2007). Inward FDI could help local firms accumulate considerable financial 
and operational assets, upgrade technological skills, and develop unique capabilities 
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(Young, Huang, & McDermott, 1996). Although indirect, inward internationalization 
has deepened emerging market businesses’ understanding of international markets and 
helped them develop international experience, in turn, allow them to undertake outward 
FDI later in some unconventional ways (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
 On the other hand, the inherent disadvantages of JVs could act as another powerful 
stimulus for Chinese MNEs to engage in outward FDI. In equity JVs in China, foreign 
partners contribute superior technology and know-how. They are often concerned about 
the potential for opportunism by their Chinese partners who develop capabilities 
through alliances that can be used later to compete against them not only in China but 
also in the global marketplace (Buckley et al., 2004). Because of significant knowledge 
exposure, foreign partners in China may intentionally impede the transfer of knowledge 
or buffer the core competencies they believe crucial to their competitive advantage. As 
many foreign firms with superior technology are reluctant to transfer their superior 
technology, JVs in China do not appear to build Chinese proprietary knowledge (Nolan, 
2001). Indeed, according to a survey covering 2334 Chinese industrial firms, 
technology transfer is very poor among partners of JVs in China (Guan, Mok, Yam, 
Chin, & Pun, 2006), and the transferred knowledge tends to diminish in quantity and 
quality (Buckley et al., 2004). Even for some of the most successful JVs in China like 
VW Shanghai and GM Shanghai, technology transfer to Chinese partners is far from 
satisfactory (Huang, 2003). Shanghai Automotive (SAIC) is desperately frustrated that 
Volkswagen and GM did not bring sufficient technology, and it has now shifted its 
strategy toward acquisition. Recently, SAIC purchased a controlling stake in South 
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Korea’s SsangYong Motor Company in an attempt to build its proprietary knowledge.  
 On top of that, strategic assets such as R&D capacity, design know-how, and brand 
names are embedded in advanced country firms, which can usually be accessed by the 
takeover of these firms or their subdivisions. Since inward FDI and particularly JVs 
cannot bring in some types of strategic assets, OFDI becomes a logical option to fill 
these resource gaps.  
 
2.3.2 OFDI as an active learning process 
Perceiving the limitation of inward FDI learning model, some learners are motivated to 
seek alternative sources of their capabilities. For example, an appropriate OFDI project 
could help firms access a broad range of external resources that are hard to access 
through market transactions. In this way, outward FDI may benefit firms that are initial 
without competitive advantages to shorten the distance from leading companies in the 
world markets by accessing appropriate assets and resources. Accordingly, compared 
to inward FDI learning model, OFDI can be considered as an active learning process. 
A growing number of papers argue that EM MNEs, including Chinese MNEs, use 
outward FDI to acquire brands, technology, and management expertise in psychically 
distant developed markets via aggressive strategic-asset-seeking (SAS) acquisitions 
(Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007). Li, Li, and Shapiro (2012) argued that a host 
country’s industry-specific technology advantage increases the propensity of Chinese 
MNEs to invest in the host country. 
 For example, Lenovo established an equity JV with a Hong Kong company and the 
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JV helped Lenovo trade and later manufacture motherboards and primarily add-on 
cards. This partnership not only accumulated needed capital and organized sales 
channels but also provided Lenovo with the opportunity to closely scrutinize foreign 
product designs and customer response. However, because of the breadth of 
technologies and capabilities, Lenovo recognizes that it must possess its proprietary 
technology. At the same time, facing more cut-throat competition in the domestic 
marketplace, Lenovo’s decision makers increasingly believe that international 
expansion is an essential stepping-stone for growth. With Lenovo aiming to compete 
globally, it needs to move into high technology, sophisticated products, and services. 
To this end, Lenovo acquired IBM’s PC business to strengthen its capabilities not only 
in the domestic market but also in global markets.  
 However, the literature leaves us with a little insight on whether the Chinese firms’ 
catch-up process could improve their innovation outputs and qualities. For example, 
while scholars like Zeng and Williamson (2007) and Luo and Tung (2007) document 
the emergence of some highly innovative emerging market MNEs, there are other 
indications that latecomer emerging market MNEs may be less innovative and more 
imitative (Luo, Sun, & Wang, 2011). For example, Amsden and Tschang (2003) point 
out that although firms from emerging economies are increasingly undertaking a range 
of R&D activities, the complexity of technological activities is still substantially lower 
than that found at the technological frontier. To solve these issues, I will explore the 
relationship between outward FDI and Chinese firms’ innovation in Chapter 4.  
33 
 
2.3.3 Innovation Studies in China 
Innovative activity is a major source of firms’ competitive advantage (Porter, 1990). 
However, our understanding of the determinants and outcomes of innovative activity 
majorly comes from studies of firms in developed markets as most innovative activity 
has occurred in those markets (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Although emerging market 
firms are usually regarded as laggards in innovation, especially in cutting-edge 
innovations (Altenburg, Schmitz, & Stamm, 2008), recent evidence suggests that 
emerging market firms do in fact innovate (Lu, 2000). For example, Chinese computing 
companies and Indian pharmaceutical companies can develop new products either by 
adding value to foreign products or by developing new products to meet specific 
domestic demands (Lu, 2000). These companies are usually the innovation leader in 
their domestic markets, and also able to compete successfully in global markets 
(Altenburg et al., 2008). Despite these developments, research on innovation by 
emerging market firms are still limited (Horng & Chen, 2008; White, Hoskisson, Yiu, 
& Bruton, 2008). 
Specifically, the existing literature on patenting, one of the primary measurement 
for innovation, in China is surprisingly sparse because of the data limitation. Even 
though there is some research on patenting at the aggregate, industry and province level, 
there is seldom research at the firm level. So far, the existing studies have majorly 
focused on the effect of technology transfer on their performance (Hu, Jefferson, & 
Jinchang, 2005) as well as the patenting activity of foreign firms relative to Chinese 




Using patent renewal information in the SIPO, Zhang and Chen (2012) notice that 
the patents requested by foreign applicants have a higher value than those requested by 
domestic applicants. However, a time trend analysis did not verify if the lower value of 
domestic patents is influenced by the recent explosive growth of patenting. By 
analyzing the patent data at the industry level, Hu (2010) investigates that patenting by 
foreign firms in China increased over 30 percent per year between 1995 and 2004. The 
analysis relies on a concordance table that allocates patent across industries. Based on 
this concordance table, Hu finds three industries machinery, chemicals, and 
telecommunications equipment have the largest number of patents in China. Import 
competition is the primary driven for the patenting by foreign residents in China. In 
other words, the amount imported by China from technologically similar industries in 
other countries positively influence foreign patenting.  
By investigating the province-level data for 1985-1995, Sun (2000) explores that 
output and employment of state-owned and collective enterprises are important sources 
in innovation output. The result is not surprising as the period is before FDI or private 
enterprise made a substantial impact on Chinese development. The R&D activity 
measured in this study was narrowed to universities and government R&D institutions, 
again a reflection of the scarcity of business enterprise R&D at that time. Based on 
provincial data from 1995 to 2000, Cheung and Lin (2004) find that the presence of 
FDI has a robust positive effect on patenting by domestic innovators, with R&D inputs 
also positive and significant but export volumes insignificant. Yueh (2009) explores the 
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determinants of aggregate patent counts in 29 Chinese provinces for the period 1991 
and 2003 and argues that there are substantial differences in patenting activity across 
provinces. This finding is not surprising based on the heterogeneity in economic 
progress between the Eastern and the Central provinces. Moreover, Li (2012) explores 
that subsidy programs proposed by local governments could stimulate patent 
application, and the grant rate did not decrease in recent years, which means subsidiary 
programs did not generate patent bubbles.  
In recent years, scholars start to match patent data with firms’ information to better 
analyze the determinants of firms’ innovation. Hu and Jefferson (2009) conduct their 
analysis at the firm-level exploiting a large National Bureau of Statistics dataset and 
focusing on domestic patenting with SIPO during 1995-2001. The main limitation of 
the analysis is that only firms’ self-reported patent counts are available. Firms only 
report an aggregate patent count, not distinguishing between innovation, utility, and 
design patents. Since only innovation patents require an examination by SIPO, utility 
and design patents are likely to protect innovations characterized by a lower incentive 
step and thus to embody little technological progress. Hu and Jefferson (2009) explain 
the recent increase in firms’ patenting activity in China by the presence of FDI, the 
change in the patent law and the anticipation of China’s WTO accession in 2001. The 
authors also find the Patents-R&D elasticity to be higher for domestic than for foreign-
owned companies, which they explain by suggesting that foreign firms conduct R&D 
in China primarily to adapt existing products and patent existing inventions.  
 Eberhardt, Helmers, and Yu (2011) analyzes characteristics of the explosion of 
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patent filings by Chinese firms both domestically and in the United States. By 
constructing a firm-level dataset matching USPTO and SIPO patents to Chinese 
manufacturing census data for 1999-2006, they investigate the drivers of the explosion 
in patent applications in China. Their results show that there is a significant difference 
in the firm characteristics in these two categories of patenting, patenting an innovation 
with both SIPO and USPTO, and merely patenting with SIPO. They find that firms 
which fall into the former category tend to be younger, considerably more export-
oriented and larger than their peers which the only patent in China. Similarly, using a 
merged dataset of Chinese patent data and industrial survey data with a focus on 
patenting activities of Chinese large and medium-sized enterprises under local patent 
subsidy programs, Dang and Motohashi (2015) make a bibliometric analysis and test if 
patent statistics are a good indicator of innovation in China. Their empirical results 
prove that patent statistics are important indicators of innovation as the patent count is 
related with R&D input and financial output.  
 Based on Chinese acquisitions of innovatively developed market firms in the US, 
Japan and Europe, Anderson, Sutherland, and Severe (2015) found that measures of 
domestic innovation performance in China significantly improve in the wake of these 
acquisitions. The innovative activity in the acquired developed market firms, however, 
does not significantly change. Drawing on agency theory, Jia, Huang, and Zhang (2015) 
show that agency costs generate imbalanced outcomes in innovation---the Chinese 
listed SOEs with severe agency costs responded to the implementation of the public 
policy incentivizing innovations by increasing the rate of patent production but they 
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lowered the rate at which they generated novel patents. 
To contribute to the innovation literature on Chinese firms, I will investigate the 
OFDI and firm innovation relationship in Chapter 4 by matching Chinese listed 
manufacturing firms with their patenting data in SIPO  
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Table 2: Analysis on Chinese Patent data  
 
Authors Data Major Findings 
Sun (2000) Patent data at the provincial-level 
from 1985 to 1995 
Output and employment of state-owned and collective enterprises were found to be 
an important force in innovation output and overall the relative level of provincial 
development seeming to drive the empirical results. 
 
Cheung & Lin (2004) Patent data at the provincial-level 
from 1995 to 2000 
The presence of FDI has a positive impact on patenting by domestic innovators, with 
R&D inputs also positive and significant but export volumes insignificant. 
 
Yueh (2009) Patent data at the provincial-level 
from 1991 to 2003 
The R&D personnel is found to be a significant determinants of patents. While per 
capita GDP increases the propensity to innovate across all regions, notable 
heterogeneity exists.  
 
Li (2012) Patent data at provincial level From the institutional perspective, this study proposes that patent subsidy programs 
implemented by each provincial region have played an important role in the growth 
of Chinese patenting.  
 
Hu (2010) Patent data at the industry level 
during 1995-2004 
Hu finds machinery, chemicals, and telecommunications equipment industries to 
have by far the largest number of patents in China. Patenting by foreign residents in 
China is suggested to be driven by import competition, that is, foreign patenting is 
positively correlated with the amount imported by China from technologically 
similar industries in other countries.  
 
Hu & Jefferson (2009) Aggregate patenting data in SIPO 
during 1995-2001 
Recent increase in firms’ patenting activity in China is because of the presence of 





Zhang & Chen (2012) Aggregate patenting renewal 
data in SIPO 
Patents requested by domestic applicants have a lower value than those requested by 
foreign applicants. Chinese firms may patent under local policy demand rather than 
market competition. 
 
Eberhardt, Helmers, & 
Yu (2011) 
A firm-level dataset by matching 
USPTO and SIPO patents to 
Chinese manufacturing census 
data for 1999-2006 
The patent explosion is accounted for by a tiny, highly select group of Chinese 
companies in the ICT equipment industry. Firms patenting in both US and China 
are younger, larger and more export-oriented than firms patenting exclusively in 
China. 
 
Dang & Motohashi 
(2015) 
A merged dataset of Chinese 
patent data and industrial survey 
data from 1999 to 2008 
The patent count is correlated with R&D input and financial output, which 
suggests that patent statistics are meaningful indicators. Patent subsidy programs 
increase patent counts more than 30%. 
 
Jia, Huang, & Zhang 
(2015) 
A firm-level dataset by matching 
SIPO patents for Chinese listed 
SOEs from 2001 to 2009 
After implementation of pro-innovation public policies, the Chinese SOEs in 
which agency problems are more severe have a higher rate of producing patents in 
general---but a lower rate of producing patents that are deemed novel---than before 
the implementation of the policies and than the SOEs in which agency problems 
are less severe.  
 
Anderson, Sutherland, 
& Severe (2015) 
A firm-level dataset by matching 
SIPO patents to Chinese firms 
acquisition in developed markets 
Domestic market patent of Chinese MNEs rises significantly in the wake of 
acquisitions, while those of the acquired target do not significantly change.  
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CHAPTER THREE: AN INTRODUCTION OF THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
3.1 A brief description of Chinese firms’ outward FDI 
China is an appropriate empirical setting to test this dissertation framework. Since the 
early 2000s, Chinese firms have begun to ‘go global’ as the government formally 
initiated the “Going abroad” policy (Buckley et al., 2007b). It provided strong, national 
public endorsement for an institutional environment that fosters OFDI. Based on this 
principal strategy, a series of regulations were announced in the several years following 
2000 and complex regulation repertories were constructed. The Chinese government 
also completed the transformation from a regulator to guide; that is from a regime that 
directly intervenes in business decisions and commands business outcomes to a state 
which influences and directs the market through rules and a broad set of administrative 
bodies (Bach, Newman, & Weber, 2006). The Chinese government use this ‘go abroad’ 
strategy to serve two important objectives. First, the government believes that engaging 
in OFDI is one of the most efficient ways to gain foreign knowledge and hence help 
increase the productivity and competitiveness of Chinese firms ((Buckley et al., 2007b; 
Deng, 2009). Second, having its firms engaged in the international market helps China 
increase its economic and political influence internationally (Morck et al., 2008; Wang 
et al., 2012a). 
Actually, following the launch of China’s ‘go global’ policy in 1999, Chinese 
outward direct investment grows sharply since 2002. Nowadays, China is the country 
with largest FDI inflow and outflow among the emerging economies. Figure 2 shows 
the development trend of FDI in China and outward FDI from China in past decade. In 
recent years, Chinese companies made some megadeals in developed markets. For 
example, CNOOC made a $15 billion acquisition of Nexen in Canada, and Shuanghui 
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acquired the U.S. Company Smithfield at a $5 billion deal, which are the largest 
overseas deals undertaken by Chinese firms in oil and food industries respectively. The 
consulting firms predict that outflows of Chinese FDI to both developed and developing 
countries are expected to grow further (UNCTAD, 2013).  
The sample for this study consists of publicly listed Chinese firms in the 
manufacturing sector and their FDIs from 2002 to 2010. Table 3 shows the no. of 
projects in each year by listed firms in manufacturing industries. The table 3 shows that 
Chinese firms have a more foreign market investment in recent years; investments last 
three years’ account for 43 percent of total investments. Table 4 shows the distribution 
of entry modes in each year by listed firms. From this table, it seems that Chinese listed 
firms have a preference for greenfield investment to acquisitions. Three-quarters of 
projects are set up by greenfield entry mode. Table 5 lists the top ten destinations for 
Chinese manufacturing listed firms’ foreign investments. It shows that developed 
countries are the top selection for Chinese MNEs. Table 6 shows foreign investments 
by listed firms’ two-digit industries. From this table, it seems that the top five 
manufacturing industries that more active in overseas equity investments are the 
computer, communication and other electronical equipment, pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, raw chemical materials and chemical products, special equipment 









Figure 2: FDI in China and OFDI from China 
 
Data Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
Table 3: Number of foreign market investments by year 
Year  Number of investments Percentage 
2002 26 3.40 
2003 74 9.69 
2004 54 7.07 
2005 76 9.95 
2006 91 11.91 
2007 108 14.14 
2008 130 17.02 
2009 104 13.61 
2010 101 13.22 
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Table 4: Distribution of foreign investment projects by entry mode per year 
Year Greenfield Acquisition Total 
2002 25 1 26 
2003 71 3 74 
2004 48 6 54 
2005 49 27 76 
2006 88 3 91 
2007 68 40 108 
2008 95 35 130 
2009 66 38 104 
2010 64 37 101 
Total 574 190 764 
 
 
Table 5: Top 10 destinations for foreign market investments 
 Destination Number of investments 
1 Hong Kong 209 
2 United States 96 
3 United Kingdom 41 
4 Germany 30 
5 Australia 30 
6 Netherlands 26 
7 Singapore 25 
8 Japan 22 
9 Canada 20 
10 Vietnam 15 
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Table 6: Number of foreign market investments by parent firms’ industry 
Industry name Number Percent Industry name Number Percent 
Farm products processing 10 2.89 Chemical fiber manufacturing 5 1.45 
Food manufacturing 6 1.73 Rubber and plastic product industry 7 2.02 
Wine, drinks and refined tea manufacturing 6 1.73 Non-metallic mineral products 14 4.05 
Textile 16 1.45 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 14 4.05 
Textiles, garments and apparel industry 5 1.45 Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 19 5.49 
Leather, fur, feathers, and related products  2 0.58 Metal products 7 2.02 
Timber processing 1 0.29 General equipment manufacturing 22 6.36 
Furniture manufacturing 3 0.87 Special equipment manufacturing 32 9.25 
Papermaking and paper products 8 2.31 Automobile manufacturing 20 5.78 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 2 0.58 Instrument and meter manufacturing 2 0.58 
Culture and education, arts and crafts, sports 
and entertainment products manufacturing 
1 0.29 Railway, shipbuilding, aerospace and other 
transportation equipment manufacturing 
10 2.89 
Petroleum processing, and nuclear fuel 
processing 
1 0.29 Computer, communication, and other 
electronical equipment 
61 17.63 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 32 9.25 Other manufacturing 3 0.87 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing 36 10.4 Total 346 100 
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3.2 A brief description of Chinese patent information  
3.2.1 The Chinese patent system  
China’s first patent law came into force in 1985. The patent law in China was 
reinstituted with similar features to those of Europe and Japan rather than the U.S. Since 
then, China’s patent law was amended three times (in 1992, 2001, and 2009). The 
second comprehensive amendment of the patent law, adopted on 25th August 2000 and 
effective from 1st July 2001, was necessary to bring China’s patent law in line with the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
which China adopted with WTO entry in November 2001.  
China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) grants three types of patents: 
invention, utility model, and design patents. According to the SIPO, while invention 
patent applications receive a substantive examination by patent examiners for novelty, 
inventive steps, and practical applicability before grant, utility model, and design patent 
applications are granted on a registration basis without substantive examination and 
thus represent small and incremental innovations. Compared with invention patents, 
utility model and design patents also have a shorter protection period (a term of 10 years 
compared with 20 years for invention patents), and are less expensive (lower 
application, attorney, and renewal fees, and no examination fees), and are more quickly 
granted (0.5-1 year grant lags compared with 2-3 years for invention patents). Because 
of these differences, I focus on invention patents in this paper to better capture firms’ 
innovative capability and quality of their innovation. Here, the SIPO invention patents 
correspond to USPTO ‘utility’ patents.  
 
3.2.2 Basic features of Chinese patents and database 
Like patents of other countries, Chinese patents provide standardized, fine-grained 
46 
 
information on the innovation concerned, including technical descriptions, the 
assignee(s), the inventor(s), the time (application and grant dates), the location 
(assignee address, but not inventor address), the technological domain to which it 
belongs (technology classes), the scope of property rights (claims), and so forth. One 
limitation is that citations data do not exist because the SIPO does not have consistent 
requirements for including citations to past patents or non-patent documents as prior 
art. This limitation can be partially remedied by using the number of unique IPC classes 
assigned, which can serve as an indicator of patent value.  
As shown in Figure 3, China has experienced a sustained, strong growth in patent 
filings in the past decades. For instance, applications for invention patents, the type of 
patent that is most comparable across countries, to the SIPO increased from 63204 in 
2001 to 391177 in 2010 beating Japan to become the second-largest patenting filing 
country. However, patent data do not come with firm identifiers that can be used to link 
to other firm-level data sources, presenting a challenge to researchers, policy makers, 
and business managers who seek to understand the firm-level underpinnings of 
innovation. He, Tong, He, Zhang, and Lu (2013) developed a patent database of Chinese 
listed companies based on the patent filed with China’s SIPO, to complement prior 
matching projects that mostly focused on firms in developed economies, notably the 
U.S. and Europe. 
In this dissertation, by matching the patent data in SIPO with Chinese firms listed 
on the mainboard of Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchange, and narrowing focus on 
manufacturing firms, the final sample in essay 2 consists of 638 firms from 2002 to 





Figure 3: Growth of invention patent application in SIPO (2002-2010) 
 



































Table 7: Summary statistics of top 10 listed firms filing with SIPO between 2002 and 2010 
Stock 
code 
Company name Listed 
year 










000063 ZTE 1997 Computer, communication and other 
electronical equipment 
392 21541 52 383 
600019 Baoshan Iron & Steel 2000 Smelting and pressing of ferrous 
metals 
312 1487 8 277 
000016 Konka Group 1992 Computer, communication, and other 
electronical equipment 
395 957 8 46.2 
600535 Tianjin TASLY 2002 Pharmaceutical manufacturing             274 618 2 6.11 
600839 Changhong 1994 Computer, communication and other 
electronical equipment 
395 519 6 73.1 
601600 Aluminum Corp. 2007 Smelting and pressing of nonferrous 
metals 
321 506 5 298 
000625 Chongqing Changan 1997 Automobile manufacturing 361 474 2 2.02 
000898 Angang Steel 1997 Smelting and pressing of ferrous 
metals 
312 422 0 0 
000039 CIMC 1994 Metal products 333 347 57 4060 
600060 Qingdao Hisense 1997 Computer, communication, and other 
electronical equipment 
395 343 2 33.2 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PERFORMANCE ASPIRATION, FOREIGN 
COMPETITION, AND CHINESE FIRMS’ OUTWARD FDI 
4.1 Introduction 
As outward FDI from emerging economies (EE) especially China has increased 
substantially in recent years, a more thorough understanding of this phenomenon of 
Chinese MNEs can help to advance the existing MNE theories further (Luo & Tung, 
2007). Previous theoretical studies highlight that a primary difference between Chinese 
MNEs and MNEs from developed economies is that they are driven by different 
motivations (Mathews, 2006; Witt & Lewin, 2007). Lu et al. (2010) and Wang et al. 
(2012a) developed a framework from the strategy tripod perspective by incorporating 
the direct effect of firms’ resources, institutional environments, and industry dynamics 
on outward FDI by Chinese MNEs. However, I propose that a theory of OFDI must 
include the factors that motivate decision makers to pursue major changes in corporate 
activities. Specifically, to address the determinant of OFDI, it is necessary to understand 
the perspective of managers situated within firms and what motivates them to initiate a 
search that eventuates in OFDI. 
Attention to aspiration and their effect on organizational change are the key 
component in the behavioral theory of the firm (Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & March, 
1963; Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; March & Shapira, 1987; March & Shapira, 
1992; Ocasio, 1997). A cornerstone of the theory is a model in which firms set their 
aspiration levels to reflect organizational goals, which then serve as a benchmark for 
assessing observed performance (Cyert & March, 1963). These aspiration levels 
facilitate the interpretation of prior performance, which, in turn, influences the 
probability of organizational change by modifying managerial risk preferences and 
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search behavior. Based on literature review in Chapter 2, previous studies use 
behavioral theory of the firm to explain if firms would form non-local ties (Baum et al., 
2005a), to engage in R&D investment (Chen et al., 2007; Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 
2007; Greve, 2003a; Nohria & Gulati, 1996), to select partners of equal or different 
status (Shipilov et al., 2011), to carry out acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Kim et al., 
2015), and to introduce new production (Gaba & Joseph, 2013; Tyler & Caner, 2016). 
Despite the extensive research, few scholars have used the behavioral theory of the firm 
to explain a firm’s high-risk internationalization decisions especially for firms from 
emerging market. Internationalization has the potential to transform organizations and 
increase firms’ competitive advantages. Accordingly, the behavioral theory of the firm 
appears well suited to specifying the conditions under which decision-makers are likely 
to take OFDI. 
 Cyert and March (1963) highlight two key stimuli for search---problems and slack. 
Problemistic search is an effort to identify alternatives to current activities that resolve 
performance shortfalls. Slack search occurs when firms possess excess resources that 
allow for experimentation, which help firms to identify and pursue new opportunities 
(Levinthal & March, 1981). By analyzing the effects of performance relative to 
aspiration levels on Chinese firms’ OFDI, this study attempts to provide a behavioral 
explanation for OFDI decisions and investigate the role of foreign competitions in the 
domestic market. 
 
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Performance below aspiration level 
Organizations respond to low performance by making a broad range of strategic and 
operational changes, including entering new market niches, acquiring resources, and 
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increasing R&D and innovativeness (Audia & Greve, 2006; Audia et al., 2000; Greve, 
1998, 2003a; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; Lant et al., 1992). Although search theorists 
have argued that organizations respond to low performance by making changes, others 
have suggested that organizations are inert owing to constraints from internal politics 
and external commitments (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), commitment to failing courses 
of action (McNamara, Moon, & Bromiley, 2002; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), 
and perceptual biases (Milliken & Lant, 1991). In other words, performance below 
aspiration level triggers both efforts to change an organization and efforts to prevent 
such change (Greve, 1998). 
However, I would like to propose that even though performance far below 
aspirations is an engine for problem-driven search, the resource availability might 
constrain their motivation. The behavioral theory of the firm did not consider the 
resource availability and capability for the firm under the situation that performs far 
below aspiration levels. The implicit assumption in prior research that firms have 
enough resources to undertake organizational change, even though their performance 
far below the aspiration level, should be released, especially for firms from emerging 
economies. Audia and Greve (2006) argued that a firm’s stock of resources influences 
the position of the survival point. The buffering effect of a large stock of resources 
lowers the performance level at which the organization’s survival is in danger. 
Accordingly, as OFDI is a high uncertain investment and needs lots of resources, the 
resource constraints might be more salient when I analyze the OFDI decisions. In other 
words, an inability to generate and consider alternatives makes decision makers rigid.  
From another perspective, below aspiration performers may engage in domestic 
investment directly toward improving the performance of existing businesses in the 
home market rather than turn to the search of internationalization with limited resource. 
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Organizations always search for solutions in the proximity of the perceived problem. In 
other words, outward FDI may not be the solution matched with a performance problem. 
Accordingly, problemistic search triggered by the performance below aspirations may 
not result in changes in the corporate portfolio through outward FDI. Iyer and Miller 
(2008) proposed that the problemistic search argument needs to be modified for 
corporate changes in strategy such as internationalization. Managers of organizations 
with low performance may change them in ways other than internationalization, such 
as downsizing, productivity improvement, or diversification (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 
2001; Anand & Singh, 1997). Thus, the link between an organizational problem and 
foreign expansion is obscured by noise generated by alternate sources of solutions. 
Based on attention-based theory, decision makers will be selective in the issues and 
answers they attend to at any one time, and what decision makers do depend on what 
issues and answers they focus their attention on. Meanwhile, solutions compete for the 
attention of managers (Ocasio, 1997), so it is not guaranteed that the outward FDI will 
be the solution matched with a performance problem especially for below-aspiration 
performers with resource constraint. Because search is oriented toward an expedient 
solution to the problem, the most immediate results, then, is an incremental adjustment 
of practices through to be causally related to the problem.  
 Accordingly, these arguments emphasize different processes underlying decision 
making---an inability to generate higher uncertain alternatives and a desire to pursue 
domestic investment they familiar with. Hence, problemistic search triggered by the 
performance below aspirations may not result in changes in the corporate portfolio 
through outward FDI.   
Hypothesis 1a: As firms’ performance falls below the aspiration level, the extent of firms’ 
outward FDI decreases.  
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4.2.2 Performance above aspiration level  
Achieving a performance exceeding aspirations is the way in which slack accumulates 
(Levinthal & March, 1981). Slack search is most likely to appear in firms that have 
persistent positive attainment discrepancies. The slack-driven search prediction stems 
from the idea that performance above aspirations leads to experimentation and 
organizational change because success provides managers with access to additional or 
lower-cost resources and instills confidence in their abilities to pursue promising ideas 
(Antonelli, 1989; Cyert & March, 1963; Garud & Nayyar, 1994; Lant et al., 1992; 
Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Singh, 1986). 
It is often suggested that increased organizational resources allow experimentation 
and organizational change (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1981). Organizations that 
perform above their aspiration levels have greater opportunities for experimentation 
and less strict performance monitoring and so have the resources and managerial 
patience needed to expand abroad. High-level managers can formalize slack search by 
allocating amounts of time and resources to work on foreign expansion and applying 
loose performance standards for new investments (Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990). In 
contrast, strict performance monitoring for lower performers can cause new foreign 
activities to be aborted before an organization has accumulated enough experience to 
know whether they will eventually improve its performance.  
 Pitelis (2007) argue that slack resources of a firm are critical in explaining the 
strategy of the firm. The presence of abundant slack resources may induce firms to take 
on more risk, and hence, the slack resources may be used to engage in OFDI. In the 
behavioral view, the presence of slack resources enables firms to increase search, which 
generates opportunities for change (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1981). 
By extension, slack can facilitate search resulting in major changes in strategy, as when 
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firms undertake OFDI. The availability of slack resources makes foreign expansion 
feasible and buffers the risk associated with a firm’s OFDI. Cheng and Kesner (1997) 
point out that the possession of slack resources in deed affects firm behaviors, and more 
importantly the thinking behind strategic actions. Therefore, when slack resources are 
available, decision makers are more confident to emphasize the development of their 
strategies.  
Although some types of high performance may not create slack resources (Greve, 
2003a), most lower the cost of acquiring them (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Even without 
freer resources, greater risk taking may occur as a result of decision makers’ heightened 
beliefs in their infallibility and because the downside of failure is mitigated by the large 
buffer between current performance and aspirations (March & Shapira, 1992; Miller, 
1990). Slack driven search may increase the tendency for decision makers to initiate 
risky OFDI in the hope of even greater gain.   
Accordingly, I propose that firms’ response to positive performance gap conform 
to the slack search argument. The positive performance gap motivates loosening 
controls and greater experimentation, so the extent of outward FDI should increase.  
Hypothesis 1b: As firms’ performance increases above the aspiration level, the extent 
of firms’ outward FDI increases. 
 
4.2.3 Foreign competitions in domestic markets 
Previous studies in developed countries propose that the foreign competition in a firm’s 
main business is likely to influence a firm’s international strategy. Foreign competition 
is more likely to increase competitive rivalry since foreign-based firms can possess both 
country and firm-specific capabilities that differ substantially from those of domestic 
firms. Numerous industry-level studies document the significant economic and 
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competitive ramifications of increased foreign competition in a country’s domestic 
markets (Caves, 1974; Driffield & Munday, 2000). First, increased competition from 
foreign firms may bring about changes in the rate of technological developments in an 
industry (Scherer & Huh, 1992) and as a result, may lead to greater pressure to increase 
efficiency to remain competitive (Driffield & Munday, 2000). Second, increased 
foreign competition in a firm’s domestic market may also decrease industry profit 
margins (Ghosal, 2002). Third, competition from foreign firms introduces diverse and 
less familiar capabilities into an industry and can create a more uncertain competitive 
environment (Ghoshal, 1987). All the evidence prove that foreign competition in a 
firm’s domestic market may significantly intensify competition at the industry level 
(Tybout, 2001). 
 From foreign firms’ perspective, FDI means a lock into a new competitive arena 
for them. Failure in foreign markets means the loss of sunk costs and substantial new 
costs associated with exit barriers (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Foreign competitors 
will commit significant resources to such ventures only if they are confident that the 
enterprise will succeed. FDI market entry indicates a credible risk to local firms and 
domestic market power was not a sufficiently effective deterrent. As the competitor 
become more established, incumbent capability weakens. The incumbent no longer has 
exclusive access to local inputs, and the distance liability gap narrows. At the same time, 
the competitor became more committed and entrenched through local investment. 
Intensified competitive rivalry makes the industry less attractive regarding local output 
markets.  
However, for the vast majority of firms in China, their domestic market is the most 
significant regarding sales and operations (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Domestic firms 
allocate resources to their home market business portfolio and are highly committed to 
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protecting their investment. They would like to defend domestic market power and 
market share. Competitive aggressiveness has been shown to improve the chances of a 
firm maintaining or improving its market position (Ferrier, Fhionnlaoich, Smith, & 
Grimm, 2002). The studies by Wiersema and Bowen (2008) suggest a pattern, which is 
in line with what has been labeled a ‘global focusing’ strategy, where firms respond to 
increased competition by expanding their international diversification to take advantage 
of the ability to leverage resources cross-nationally (Meyer, 2006). The findings of 
Hutzschenreuter and Grone (2009) is in line with Rumelt’s classic ‘escape hypothesis’ 
(Rumelt, 1991; Rumelt, 1974), which argue that firms may invest abroad to avoid the 
challenges imposed by foreign competitors in their home market and access alternative 
sources of resources to balance their portfolio. 
Thus, exposure to foreign competition in the home market increases firms’ 
motivation to seek opportunities overseas.  
Hypothesis 2: As the level of foreign competition in home markets increases, the extent 
of firms’ outward FDI increases. 
  
4.2.4 Moderating effect of foreign competition 
To extend the model of decision making to a competitive context and develop the theory 
about how foreign competition in domestic markets affects firms’ decision making, I 
build on the concept of bounded rationality, a fundamental concept in the behavioral 
theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963). March (1997) suggested that when rationality 
is bounded, decision makers adopt alternative logics to guide choice. These logics also 
define what is appropriate and what directs actors’ attention to specific features of a 
situation.  
As I proposed previously, firms performing below their aspiration levels may be 
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resource constraint and decrease their extent of OFDI as their performance decrease. 
However, these arguments assume firms have the same reaction when they fail to reach 
their aspiration levels. This assumption overlooks the contingency impact of foreign 
competition on their resource allocation and focus of attention.  
On the one hand, as the target for problemistic search is to solve performance 
problems, organizations usually search for solutions in the proximity of the perceived 
problem by making the incremental adjustment of practices related to the problem. 
However, the theory also specifies that organizational search is made wider when initial 
solutions are not seen to work. Consistent with this view, organizations with 
performance below aspiration levels have been shown to engage in major initiatives, 
sometimes after first trying out smaller changes (Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990). As 
foreign rivalry decrease industry profit margins, increase pressures for great efficiency 
and technological developments (Tybout, 2001), they make the situation even worse for 
firms performing below aspiration levels. In this situation, intense foreign competition 
reduces their investment efficiency when they target to solve their performance 
problems through domestic investment. As a result, firms performing below aspiration 
levels will seek to balance their situation by developing international diversification 
opportunities, thereby reducing their vulnerability to the “attacks” by highly-committed 
competitors who can replicate any location advantages they might possess 
(Hutzschenreuter & Grone, 2009). In other words, increased foreign competition in a 
firm’s existing businesses will motivate firms performing below aspirations to take the 
foreign investment to change their situation compared to the firms in industries with a 
lower level of competition. With limited resources, these firms may relocate their 
resources to markets with higher profitability and investment efficiency, and expand 
their geographic scope to explore potential new sources of competitive advantage in 
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low-cost offshore markets that strengthen their competitive capabilities at home, adding 
a more diverse set of locations to their geographic footprint (Almor, Hashai, & Hirsch, 
2006; Dunning, 1988; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001).  
On the other hand, following attention-based view, the principle of situated 
attention indicates that what decision makers focus on, and what they do, depends on 
the particular context they are located in (Ocasio, 1997). In other words, organizational 
attention is affected by the particular context or situation they find themselves in. 
Conceptually, organizations receive issues from the environment, feeds to decision 
makers, and retrieves candidate answers from the environment (Vissa, Greve, & Chen, 
2010). In this case, organizations may draw on the experience of foreign firms when 
selecting the responses to a given problem when they are in industries with the higher 
foreign competition. In other words, firms in industries with intense foreign competition 
may imitate foreign competitors’ behavior and look for solutions in foreign markets. 
Accordingly, these firms will be more likely to do the problemistic search to undertake 
outward FDI.  
Hypothesis 3a: As firms’ performance falls below the aspiration level, the extent of firms’ 
outward FDI decreases less when there is higher foreign competition in home markets.  
 
 March and Olsen (2006) argued that a decision maker following the logic of 
appropriateness makes decisions based mainly on the congruence between role 
expectations and an action, rather than on conscious calculations of costs and benefits. 
It is socially important for the higher performers to maintain their lead or to win the 
position at the top of a competitive hierarchy. An expectation regarding maintaining the 
lead position is likely to induce the higher performing firms to take greater risks than 
would be prescribed by rational utility maximization. Boyle and Shapira (2012) referred 
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to this phenomenon as the liability of leading. Based on the empirical setting of 
Jeopardy! Tournament of Champions, Boyle and Shapira (2012) argued that leaders are 
prone to take unnecessary risks to maintain their leadership position in a competition. 
For many firms, sustaining industry leadership is a key organizational goal (Geroski & 
Toker, 1996; Kato & Honjo, 2006; Simon, Bilstein, & Luby, 2006). 
With slack resources, firms performing above aspiration levels are more likely to 
take OFDI as their performance relative to aspiration increases. Moreover, to keep their 
high status in the home market, exposure to foreign competition in the home market 
also increases firms’ motivation to take risky investment such as seeking strategic assets 
overseas. These firms observed that they could not win against global leaders by 
passively protecting their current competitive edge, they perceive greater incentives to 
explore complementary strategic assets overseas proactively to keep their competitive 
position better. The most motivated firms are usually those with the highest possibility 
to succeed backed by prior successful experience. Accordingly, I expect that for firms 
performing above aspiration levels, the uniqueness of their position, the narrowing of 
attention, and the fulfillment of social expectations contribute to their taking excessive 
risks to maintain their position at the top of the competition.  
Hypothesis 3b: As firms’ performance increases above the aspiration level, the extent 




4.3.1 Sample and data source 
I compile the dataset from several sources. First, I obtained the basic information and 
financial data on listed firms from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
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(CSMAR) database, which is considered a reliable database. I exclude firms in the 
service sector as service firms are different from manufacturing firms in their financial 
structures and ways of measuring their performance (Lien, Piesse, Strange, & 
Filatotchev, 2005). As a result, the sample consists of 832 firms across 27 two-digit 
industries and 112 three-digit industries. Next, I manually collect information on 
overseas subsidiaries from listed firms’ annual reports for 2002-2010. I choose 2002 as 
the starting year because FDI from China surged after China’s access to the WTO in 
2001 (MOFCOM, 2009). I define a subsidiary as any entity where the listed firm holds 
at least 20% of the equity. In annual reports required by Chinese authority, 20% of 
equity is the threshold of disclosure of subsidiaries. I identify the establishment of an 
overseas subsidiary by comparing full subsidiary lists of a given firm for consecutive 
years. If an overseas subsidiary appeared in firm i’s annual report of year t but not in 
that of year t-1, I further check the annual report and other documents about the firm 
for year t to confirm the establishment year for the subsidiary. Finally, there are 346 
firms setting up 764 foreign subsidiaries in 76 countries in 2002-2010.  
Then, I calculate the average return on assets (ROA) and sales growth of all the 
firms in the industries based on the Annual Industrial Survey Database compiled by the 
Chinese National Bureau of Statics (NBS).  The Survey Database covers industrial 
firms of all types of ownership in China and has been widely used in prior research 
(Buckley, Wang, & Clegg, 2007c; Chang & Xu, 2008). By law, all firms including 
foreign firms, with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB (or roughly $760,000 based 
on the exchange rate in 2009) in the year before the survey in China are required to 
cooperate with the survey and submit financial information. Also, foreign competition 
levels were measured based on these data as the Survey database covers information on 
foreign firms in China. I used China’s three-digit industry classification code to define 
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the industry.  
I obtain the industry-level data from the WIND database, a database that is widely 
regarded as one of the most comprehensive and authoritative data sources in China 
(Peng, Sun, & Tan, 2008), and China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology. 
I use one-year lag for all the explanatory variables to avoid possible endogeneity with 
the dependent variable. 
 
4.3.2 Dependent variable 
OFDI is an equity investment in foreign countries outside a firm’s home country, 
resulting in the setting up of a foreign subsidiary in a host country (Delios & Beamish, 
1999). Following previous literature, I measure international expansion as the count of 
foreign subsidiaries established by a firm per year. It is a flow rather than a stock 
measure of foreign subsidiaries. 
 
4.3.3 Independent and moderating variables 
Performance relative to aspirations. The performance feedback simplifying rule 
focuses on performance relative to aspirations---that is, the extent to which a focal 
firm’s performance is greater or lower than its aspiration level (Greve, 2003a). 
Aspiration formation can draw on historical and social performance criteria (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Greve, 1998). Theoretical and empirical studies have supported the 
contention that aspiration levels in organizations are functions of previous aspirations 
and feedback about actual performance (Lant, 1992; Lant et al., 1992; Lant & 
Montgomery, 1987; Mezias et al., 2002). Following previous studies (Chen, 2008; 
Greve, 2003a; Iyer & Miller, 2008) I use ROA at time t-1 as the performance measure 
because ROA captures a firm’s effectiveness in a broad manner. Following Cyert and 
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March (1963), I computed aspiration level (A) as a mixture of social and historical 
aspiration levels. The social aspiration level (SA) is the average of other firms’ 
performance (P), calculated as the mean ROA of all firms in the same three-digit 
industry. The historical aspiration (HA) level is a mixture of past-period historical 
aspiration level and the previous performance of the focal firm. Letting α1 and α2 be 
weights, the formulas are: 
Ati= α1SAti + (1- α1) HAti 
SAti=∑Ptj /no. of firms in the industry 
HAti= α2Pt-1 + (1- α2) HAt-1, i 
Here, t is time, and i and j indicate firm. I estimated the weights by searching all 
parameter values by increments of 0.1 and taking the combination giving the highest 
model “log-likelihood”. This procedure yielded a value of 0.9 for α1 and a value of 0.1 
for α2. To distinguish between the situations where performance above and below a 
firm’s aspiration level, I specified performance as a spline function (Greene, 2003) of 
firm performance relative to their aspiration level, with a knot at 0: performance-
aspiration>0 for the cases where performance is above the aspiration level, and 
performance-aspiration<0 for cases where performance is below the aspiration level. 
To better understanding, I take the absolute value of performance-aspiration<0 in the 
analysis.  
Foreign competition. To measure the foreign competition in the domestic market, 
I examine the FDI activities undertaken by all foreign firms in a particular industry in 
which the firm compete. Previous work has used several variables to reflect foreign 
firms’ competition in the industry. For instance, Aitken and Harrison (1999) used the 
employment-weighted percentage of equity owned by foreign firms. Javorcik (2004) 
measured foreign competition as the share of firm’s total equity owned by foreign 
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investors. Most studies, however, have used foreign employment shares (Buckley et al., 
2002; Caves, 1974; Driffield & Munday, 2000; Liu, Siler, Wang, & Wei, 2000). I used 
the number of employees in all foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) divided by the 
number of employees in all enterprises in an industry to measure the foreign 
competition. In robustness check, I also used assets of FOEs divided by the total assets 
of all enterprises in the industry, and revenue of FOEs divided by the total revenue of 
all enterprises in the industry to measure the foreign competition.  
To examine the interaction between firm performance and foreign competition, I 
normalized foreign competition between 0 and 1 using the lowest and highest values in 
the data. Thus, the industry with highest foreign competition (computer manufacturing) 
had a score of 1, and the smallest had a value of 0. This simplifies the interpretation of 
the coefficients in Table 2 for the minimum and maximum values in the data. The effect 
for the firms in industries with lowest foreign competition in the data is the main effect 
of performance relative to aspirations, and the effect for firms in industries with highest 
foreign competition in the data is the sum of the main effect of firm performance and 
the interaction effect between firm performance and foreign competition. The effects 
for all other firms fall in between. This approach is mathematically equivalent to the 
alternative approach of taking the interactions as deviations from the mean but is easier 
to interpret when testing hypotheses that contrast the extremes (Audia & Greve, 2006). 
 
4.3.4 Control variables 
I included several firm-level time-varying control variables that may also influence a 
firm’s OFDI activities: firm size, age, product diversification, intangible assets, slack 
resources, state ownership, central government ownership, board of director’s political 
connection and international experience, international joint venture (IJV) experience, 
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previous foreign experience, domestic investment and distance to bankruptcy. I 
controlled for firm size which is measured by the logarithm of a firm’s total assets since 
larger firms typically have more slack resources for internationalization. Firm age was 
controlled for as a proxy for experience and resources.  
 Hitt et al. (1997) found that product diversification influences a firms’ degree of 
internationalization. To control for its possible effect, I include this variable, measured 
by Entropy index approach which is conventionally applied to calculate diversification 
and takes into account the number of industries the firms participates in, the proportion 
of sales from each industrial sector. Accordingly, product diversification is measured as 
∑pi * ln (1/Pi), where Pi is the proportion of sales in industry i. I also included the 
logarithm of intangible assets to control for the impact of firms’ intangible assets on 
internationalization. According to the Chinese accounting standards, intangible assets 
are defined as long-term non-monetary assets without physical forms held by 
enterprises, including patents, non-patent technology, trademarks, copyrights, land use 
rights and concessions. To control for the effect of slack resources, following the 
classification by Bourgeois and Singh (1983) and Bromiley (1991), I used current ratio 
(current assets divided by current liabilities), which measure the liquid resources 
uncommitted to liabilities, to represent available slack, working capital-to-sales ratio, 
which captures absorption of slack related to capital utilization to measure recoverable 
slack, and equity-to-debt ratio, which reflects the ability of further borrowing to proxy 
potential slack. I standardized these three proxies and summed them up to obtain a 
general slack index.  
Following previous literature, I adopted a three-step procedure to develop the 
measurement for state ownership. First, following prior studies (Delios, Wu, & Zhou, 
2006), I captured the ownership type of a listed firm’s largest ten shareholders. Second, 
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I coded the state ownership regarding the ratio of shares held by this shareholder if the 
shareholder’s ownership type is an SOE; otherwise, its state ownership is coded as ‘0.’ 
Third, I summed all the shareholders’ proportion of SOE shares. Meanwhile, I also 
controlled for central government’s effect on firm strategies by creating a dummy 
variable equaled to 1 if the firm is controlled by the central government. Except 
government ownership, political connections are also proved to be helpful for Chinese 
firms to acquire resources and to achieve better performance (Faccio, 2006; Li & Zhang, 
2007). However, political connections are local-specific and always discourage firms 
from going abroad. In contrast, decision makers’ international experience could be 
helpful for firms in overcoming difficulties in internationalization process (Levy, Schon, 
Taylor, & Boyacigiller, 2007). Thus, I controlled for the board of directors’ (BOD) 
political connections and international experience in the analysis. BOD’s political 
connections are measured as the percentage of a board of directors who were formerly 
government officers or members of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Similarly, BOD’s 
international experience is measured as the percentage of the board of directors having 
foreign working or studying experience among the total number of board of directors.  
For IJV experience, I developed a count measure to capture Chinese firms’ 
involvement in IJVs established with foreign firms in the home country. To control for 
firms’ previous international experience, which influences firms’ further investment in 
foreign markets, I measured the number of OFDI projects by the firms accumulated to 
year t. I also included firms’ domestic investment, which is measured by the logarithmic 
transformation of firms’ total investment minus foreign investment. Finally, I controlled 
Z-score in the analysis as an indicator of how far a firm is from bankruptcy. A high Z-
score indicates that a firm is not at risk of bankruptcy.   
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I also controlled several industry level variables. Industry concentration is 
measured based on the Annual Census data. Specifically, it is measured as one minus 
the Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index equals the squared sum of sales percentages 
of firms in each three-digit industry. I rescale the industry competition proxy by 
multiplying it by 100 so that a high value reflects a highly competitive industry. 
Wiersema and Bowen (2008) argued that the ongoing globalization of markets and 
industries has fundamentally changed the competitive conditions facing firms, and is, 
therefore, likely to have a significant impact on firms’ international expansion. I 
measured industry globalization by each industry’s exports to its total sales. Industry 
growth was measured by the annual growth of sales in the industries. Moreover, given 
that consistent firm-level data on R&D intensity are not widely available in China, I use 
industry R&D intensity as a proxy. This variable is measured by the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total sales of an industry in which a firm operates. 
I used a set of year dummy variables to capture omitted variables that evolve over 
time. I also fixed the effects of sub-national regions by including dummy variables 
using two-digit area codes for provinces, autonomous regions, and centrally 
administered cities and the industry dummies to control for industry effects. 
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Table 8: Description and correlation (Essay 1) 
 Mean  S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.OFDI flow 0.10 0.67 1          
2.Performance below aspiration 0.06 0.19 -0.025 1         
3.Performance above aspiration 0.01 0.17 0.006 -0.023 1        
4.Foreign competition 0.27 0.22 0.083 0.025 0.012 1       
5.Firm size 21.35 1.10 0.181 -0.161 -0.059 -0.077 1      
6.Firm age 11.18 4.55 0.020 0.089 0.013 0.236 0.006 1     
7.Product diversification 0.27 0.39 0.003 0.008 -0.022 0.026 -0.002 0.084 1    
8.Intangible assets 16.23 4.69 0.056 -0.056 -0.021 0.073 0.185 0.190 0.113 1   
9.Slack resource -0.1 2.32 -0.027 -0.091 0.024 0.055 -0.252 -0.057 -0.061 -0.097 1  
10.State ownership 0.28 0.27 -0.041 -0.058 -0.016 -0.202 0.188 -0.377 -0.108 -0.144 -0.048 1 
11.Central government control 0.19 0.39 -0.019 -0.033 -0.012 0.053 0.130 -0.118 -0.001 -0.024 0.014 0.265 
12.BOD’s political connection 0.09 0.13 -0.010 0.022 -0.004 -0.051 -0.002 0.055 0.086 0.057 -0.038 -0.036 
13.BOD’s international experience 0.07 0.12 0.099 -0.015 -0.003 0.163 0.151 0.194 0.018 0.097 -0.025 -0.152 
14.IJV experience 0.75 2.36 0.253 -0.028 -0.005 0.146 0.216 0.144 0.060 0.112 -0.065 -0.080 
15.Previous foreign experience 1.14 8.07 0.236 0.001 -0.004 0.137 0.183 0.090 0.076 0.072 -0.039 -0.068 
16.Domestic investment 16.30 4.52 0.057 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012 0.265 0.076 0.109 0.161 -0.123 0.086 
17.Distance to bankruptcy 4.16 8.75 0.003 -0.337 0.073 0.010 -0.017 -0.014 -0.033 0.037 0.269 -0.047 
18.Industry concentration 0.62 0.47 0.006 0.054 -0.014 -0.063 0.020 0.074 0.021 0.048 -0.005 -0.063 
19.Industry globalization 0.22 0.28 0.068 0.004 0.003 0.161 -0.098 0.052 0.007 0.015 0.080 -0.031 
20.Industry sales growth 22.25 10.39 0.027 -0.054 0.003 -0.118 0.048 -0.053 0.018 -0.029 -0.062 0.111 
21.Industry R&D intensity 1.40 0.72 0.007 -0.025 0.015 0.131 -0.047 -0.036 -0.009 0.025 0.072 0.086 









 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
11.Central government control 1            
12.BOD’s political connection -0.055 1           
13.BOD’s international experience -0.024 0.011 1          
14.IJV experience -0.037 -0.036 0.183 1         
15.Previous foreign experience -0.001 0.007 0.221 0.176 1        
16.Domestic investment 0.075 -0.012 -0.002 0.143 0.068 1       
17.Distance to bankruptcy 0.014 -0.056 0.024 -0.035 -0.015 -0.071 1      
18.Industry concentration -0.055 0.060 0.042 -0.016 0.022 -0.005 -0.025 1     
19.Industry globalization 0.175 -0.056 0.099 0.101 0.098 0.008 0.007 -0.120 1    
20.Industry sales growth 0.015 0.043 0.017 -0.011 -0.042 0.017 -0.058 0.075 -0.044 1   
21.Industry R&D intensity 0.103 -0.038 0.022 -0.088 -0.005 0.028 -0.017 0.041 0.195 0.119 1  
22.Economic growth -0.032 0.095 0.122 0.005 0.082 -0.075 0.062 0.247 -0.054 -0.093 -0.093 1 
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4.3.5 Model estimation 
The use of count of foreign subsidiaries as the dependent variable proposes the use of 
a count model, such as a negative binomial (NB) or Poisson model. The NB model is 
more appropriate because the distribution of OFDI counts in our sample with a mean 
of 0.11 and a standard deviation of 0.67, indicates over dispersion and Poisson model 
requires the standard deviation of the dependent variables is closed to the mean (Greene, 
2003). However, standard NB model cannot handle the presence of excess zero counts 
in OFDI data. In contrast, a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (ZINB) 
may be a better estimation technique to deal with this problem. Following Greene (2003) 
recommendation to apply the Vuong test (Vuong, 1989), one can determine whether the 
ZINB model better describes the data than standard NB model. The Vuong Z-score in 
this study has a significant and positive value, confirming that the ZINB model is a 
better choice in analyzing OFDI decision in essay 1. Similarly, I use the AIC test to 
compare the negative binomial model with ZINB model. The results show that AIC 
favors the ZINB model.  
 
4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Hypotheses testing 
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for all variables used 
in this study. Table 9 presents the zero-inflated negative binomial regressions for the 
effects of performance aspiration on OFDI activity. Model 1 is the baseline model 
including the control variables only. In Model 2 I tested Hypothesis 1a by entering the 
absolute value of performance-aspiration<0. Model 2 showed that the estimated 
coefficient of the performance below aspirations is negative and significant, fully 
supporting Hypothesis 1a. The estimates showed that the extent of outward FDI 
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decreased as performance fell below aspiration level. In Model 3 I tested Hypothesis 
1b by entering a value of performance-aspiration>0. Model 3 showed that the estimated 
coefficient of performance above aspirations is positive and significant, fully 
supporting Hypothesis 1b. Firms performing above their aspiration levels showed an 
increase in OFDI activity as performance increases. Meanwhile, Model 3 shows that 
the coefficient of performance relative to aspiration level>0 is smaller than the absolute 
value of the coefficient of the performance below aspiration. An F-test (20.75, p<0.001) 
indicates that such a difference is significant, which means the influence of performance 
relative to aspirations on OFDI would be weaker for performance above rather than 
below aspirations. Figure 4 illustrates the reduced slope of the relationship between 
performances relative to aspiration and OFDI when performance is above aspiration 
level.  
In Model 4, the results showed that the coefficient of foreign competition is positive 
and significant, which means that foreign competition has a direct influence on firms’ 
OFDI. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. To test the moderating effect of foreign 
competition, I put the interaction term of foreign competition with performance below 
and above aspiration separately in Model 5 and 6. The results in Model 5 showed that 
the interactive effect of foreign competition and performance below aspiration is 
positive and significant. Recall that the main effect equals the effect on firms in 
industries with lowest foreign competition in the sample, and the main effect plus the 
interaction equals the effect of the firms in industries with highest foreign competitions 
in the sample. The effects on the other firms are in-between. Performance below 
aspiration has a negative and significant estimate consistent with less OFDI taking in 
firms with low foreign competition, and the interaction of performance below aspiration 
and foreign competition has a positive and significant estimate consistent with more 
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OFDI taking in firms with the high foreign competition. In this model, I test whether 
the sum of the main effect and the interaction is significantly different from 0 with a 
Wald text. The sum of the coefficients is positive and significantly different from 0, 
showing that firms in industries with higher foreign competition increase their OFDI as 
performance decreases. These results are fully consistent with Hypothesis 3a. The 
interactive effect of foreign competition and performance above aspiration is not 
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. I put the two interactions together in 
Model 7. The results are consistent.  
Figure 5 and 6 displays the moderating effect of foreign competition based on 
Model 4 in Table 9. I plot the relationship between performance below aspiration and 
the extent of taking OFDI using different level of foreign competition in Figure 5. The 
high and low foreign competition means 1 standard deviation above and below the 
mean. The steeper slope for high foreign competition (1 standard deviation above the 
mean) in Figure 5 conforms to my prediction in Hypothesis 3a. The figure shows that 
firms in a higher foreign competitive industry (1 standard deviation above the mean) 
are more likely to increase their extent of OFDI. The proposed moderating effect of 
foreign competition is thus supported for hypothesis 3a. In Figure 6, I plot the 
relationship between performance below aspiration and the extent of taking OFDI using 
the highest level of foreign competition (equals one) and low foreign competition (1 
standard deviation below the mean). Figure 6 shows that firms in industries with 
extremely high foreign competition increase their OFDI activity as their performance 
deviates from aspirations.  
 Among the significant controls, state ownership, central government control and 
BOD’s political connections (across all models) have significantly negative effects on 
Chinese firms’ OFDI, which means that government support will persuade firms to 
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focus their investment in domestic markets. Firm size (across all models) has positive 
effects on Chinese firms’ OFDI. In contrast, firm age has a negative influence, which 
means younger firms in China more actively engage in OFDI activities. Also, previous 
international experience has a positive effect, suggesting that learning effect existed in 
firms’ foreign expansion. The effect of industry globalization is significant, which 






Table 9: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression on OFDI 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Firm size 1.03*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Firm age -0.14** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.134*** -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Product diversification -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.20 -0.17 -0.19 -0.17 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Intangible assets -0.03+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
State ownership -1.63*** -1.53*** -1.54*** -1.44*** -1.43*** -1.44*** -1.43*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Central government -0.44* -0.41* -0.41* -0.47* -0.45* -0.47* -0.45* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.57** -1.67** -1.67** -1.60** -1.63** -1.60** -1.63** 
 (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.52 0.43 0.51 0.43 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
IJV experience 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Domestic investment 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.03+ 0.02+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry concentration 1.37 1.11 1.15 0.35 -0.18 0.32 -0.17 
 (2.03) (1.99) (1.99) (2.03) (2.07) (2.03) (2.06) 
Industry globalization 0.01 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01 0.01+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.55+ 0.52 0.55+ 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Performance below aspiration  -6.27*** -6.19*** -6.10*** -10.68*** -6.12*** -10.83*** 
(H1a)   (1.76) (1.75) (1.77) (2.90) (1.77) (2.92) 
Performance above aspiration   0.34** 0.35** 0.34** 0.61 0.21 
(H1b)   (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (1.12) (0.93) 
Foreign competition (H2)    2.15*** 1.71** 2.16*** 1.70** 
    (0.56) (0.59) (0.56) (0.59) 
Performance below aspiration     10.79*  10.88* 
×Foreign competition (H3a)     (5.09)  (5.12) 
Performance above aspiration       -0.94 0.46 
×Foreign competition (H3b)      (4.07) (3.16) 
_cons -23.16*** -21.79*** -21.94*** -22.64*** -21.54*** -22.62*** -21.54*** 
 (2.631) (2.637) (2.636) (2.649) (2.746) (2.649) (2.745) 
N 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 
ll -1363.7 -1354.5 -1354.1 -1346.9 -1344.8 -1346.9 -1344.8 
Incremental χ2 to model 1  18.25*** 19.16*** 33.53*** 37.67*** 33.57*** 37.68*** 
Incremental χ2 to model 4     4.14** 0.05 4.16** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator   
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  




Figure 4: The direct effects of performance relative to aspiration on OFDI flow 
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4.4.2 Robustness check 
Even though the explanatory variable performance relative to aspiration level may be 
influenced by OFDI, reverse causality problems are less likely because most Chinese 
FDI projects have started only recently. Nevertheless, I controlled for possible biases in 
the estimation in several ways. I incorporate several variables that account for firm 
characteristics. Also, I used lagged independent variables to reduce the potential 
endogeneity bias, if any.   
In addition to the results presented in Table 9, I conducted several other analyses 
to check the robustness of my results. First, to exclude the effect of performance 
variance, I included the performance variance in robustness check. I calculated the 
standard deviation of performance for each firm over a three-year period. As shown in 
Table 10, the results are consistent with my prediction and provide further support for 
the hypotheses. Second, I replaced the performance relative to aspiration variables to 
performance per se to explore if the effect on firms’ OFDI decisions is because of 
performance relative to aspirations or performance per se. The results in Table 11 show 
that the performance per se does not have effects on the level of firms’ OFDI.  
Third, I further use two methods to measure the foreign competition and further 
test my hypotheses: (1) assets of FOEs divided by the total assets of all enterprises in 
the industry; (2) revenue of FOEs divided by the total revenue of all enterprises in the 
industry. The results of the regression analysis support my proposed relationships as 
shown in Table 12 and 13. Fourth, the significance of most of the effects except foreign 
competition was robust by splitting the sample based on firms’ performance above or 
below aspiration levels. The results were shown in Table 14. In models 3 and 4, the 
coefficients for performance-aspiration were positive and significant, thereby providing 
further support for Hypothesis 1a and 1b. Moreover, in models 5, the coefficients for 
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interaction terms were significant and negative for firms performing below aspirations, 
which provides further support for hypothesis 3a. Also, the insignificant coefficient for 
interaction terms of foreign competition and firms performing above aspirations is 
consistent with main results and does not provide support for hypothesis 3b. However, 
one major difference with the main model analysis is that the coefficients for the foreign 
competition were not significant for firms performing above aspiration, but significant 
for firms performing below aspiration. That means foreign competition may persuade 
firms performing below aspiration levels to escape from the domestic market and 
expand to foreign markets, however, its influence on firms performing above aspiration 
was not obvious.  
Fifth, I excluded investment projects in Hong Kong, Macau, and Caribbean tax 
havens (Bermuda, Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands) because outward FDI from 
China to these destinations may be driven by tax considerations (Hampton & 
Christensen, 2002). As shown in Table 15, the results are consistent with my predictions. 
Sixth, except the dummy variable for provinces in the main analysis, I further included 
the sub-national institutions as control variables in the robustness check in Table 16. 
Because of the data on sub-national institutions is from 2002 to 2007, the sample size 
in this robustness check is smaller than the main analysis. The results are still consistent 
and further support my predictions. Finally, I add firms’ previous patent flow to control 
the influence of firms’ technological capabilities on their outward FDI. As shown in 







Table 10: Robustness Check-Control for performance variance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Performance variance 0.49 0.11 0.58 0.66 0.57 0.09 0.64 
 (0.48) (0.58) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.56) (0.45) 
Firm size 1.03*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Firm age -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Product diversification -0.24 -0.48* -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.48* -0.20 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) 
Intangible assets -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04+ -0.04* -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.10 -0.12+ -0.12 -0.13+ -0.13+ -0.13+ -0.13+ 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
State ownership -1.63*** -1.56*** -1.55*** -1.47*** -1.45*** -1.49*** -1.45*** 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Central government -0.43* -0.41* -0.40+ -0.46* -0.44* -0.47* -0.44* 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.34* -1.61* -1.41* -1.34* -1.38* -1.56* -1.37* 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.65) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.76 0.73 0.82+ 0.70 0.61 0.62 0.61 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) 
IJV experience 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Domestic investment 0.04* 0.04+ 0.05* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04+ 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry concentration 0.65 1.04 0.45 -0.35 -0.87 0.31 -0.85 
 (2.21) (2.15) (2.18) (2.23) (2.29) (2.20) (2.29) 
Industry globalization 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.53 0.50 0.56+ 0.61+ 0.65* 0.56+ 0.65+ 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
Performance below aspiration  -6.00*** -5.44** -5.37** -9.69*** -5.84*** -9.77*** 
(H1a)   (1.64) (1.70) (1.72) (2.92) (1.66) (2.93) 
Performance above aspiration   0.23* 0.24* 0.24* 0.10 -0.17 
(H1b)   (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.74) (0.54) 
Foreign competition (H2)    2.21*** 1.78** 2.18*** 1.75** 
    (0.61) (0.64) (0.61) (0.65) 
Performance below aspiration     9.93+  10.17* 
×Foreign competition (H3a)     (5.09)  (5.06) 
Performance above aspiration       0.56 1.43 
×Foreign competition (H3b)      (2.58) (1.83) 
_cons -24.72*** -23.08*** -23.39*** -24.26*** -23.16*** -24.28*** -23.18*** 
 (2.943) (2.922) (2.951) (2.961) (3.068) (2.958) (3.060) 
N 5416 5416 5416 5416 5416 5416 5416 
ll -1166.8 -1157.0 -1159.9 -1153.3 -1151.6 -1150.2 -1151.5 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  




Table 11: Robustness Check-Direct effect of performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm size 1.04*** 1.08*** 1.07*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Firm age -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Product diversification -0.23 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Intangible assets -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
State ownership -1.60*** -1.50*** -1.51*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Central government -0.45* -0.50* -0.50* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.45* -1.37* -1.37* 
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.64 0.51 0.51 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) 
IJV experience 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Domestic investment 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry concentration 1.29 0.54 0.56 
 (2.00) (2.01) (2.01) 
Industry globalization 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.41 0.44 0.44 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
GDP per capita 1.35 1.86 1.86 
 (3.07) (3.077) (3.08) 
Performance 0.65 0.652 0.78 
 (0.95) (1.030) (1.38) 
Foreign competition  2.02*** 2.04*** 
  (0.55) (0.56) 
Performance ×Foreign competition    -0.41 
   (2.02) 
_cons -23.49*** -24.14*** -24.16*** 
 (2.592) (2.603) (2.601) 
N 6252 6252 6252 
ll -1386.5 -1380.0 -1380.0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 






Table 12: Robustness Check-Foreign competition (asset share) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Firm size 1.03*** 0.978*** 0.98*** 1.03*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Firm age -0.14** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Product diversification -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Intangible assets -0.03+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
State ownership -1.63*** -1.53*** -1.54*** -1.46*** -1.42*** -1.44*** -1.42*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Central government -0.44* -0.41* -0.41* -0.44* -0.44* -0.45* -0.44* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.57** -1.67** -1.67** -1.59** -1.58** -1.55* -1.57** 
 (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.52 0.40 0.49 0.40 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) 
IJV experience 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Domestic investment 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.03+ 0.02+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry concentration 1.37 1.11 1.15 1.06 0.22 0.75 0.28 
 (2.03) (1.99) (1.99) (1.95) (2.06) (2.00) (2.04) 
Industry globalization 0.01 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.55+ 0.52 0.55+ 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Performance below aspiration  -6.27*** -6.19*** -5.82*** -12.19*** -6.26*** -12.36*** 
(H1a)   (1.76) (1.75) (1.76) (3.52) (1.78) (3.54) 
Performance above aspiration   0.34* 1.49*** 0.33* 0.10 -0.49 
(H1b)   (0.14) (0.37) (0.14) (1.31) (1.00) 
Foreign competition (H2)    2.34*** 1.83** 2.32*** 1.78** 
    (0.53) (0.56) (0.53) (0.56) 
Performance below aspiration     12.61*  13.47* 
×Foreign competition (H3a)     (6.25)  (6.47) 
Performance above aspiration       0.83 2.74 
×Foreign competition (H3b)      (4.304) (3.205) 
_cons -23.16*** -21.79*** -21.94*** -22.80*** -21.78*** -22.82*** -21.76*** 
 (2.63) (2.64) (2.64) (2.68) (2.69) (2.67) (2.77) 
N 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 
ll -1363.7 -1354.5 -1354.1 -1346.8 -1343.2 -1345.3 -1343.0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Table 13: Robustness Check-Foreign competition (revenue share) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Firm size 1.03*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Firm age -0.14** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Product diversification -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
Intangible assets -0.03+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
State ownership -1.63*** -1.53*** -1.54*** -1.46*** -1.44*** -1.46*** -1.44*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Central government -0.44* -0.41* -0.41* -0.45* -0.44* -0.45* -0.44* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.57** -1.67** -1.67** -1.59** -1.61** -1.59** -1.61** 
 (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.56 0.47 0.56 0.48 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) 
IJV experience 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Domestic investment 0.02 0.02 0.021 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.03+ 0.02+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry concentration 1.37 1.11 1.15 0.72 0.11 0.76 0.18 
 (2.03) (1.99) (1.99) (2.01) (2.07) (2.00) (2.06) 
Industry globalization 0.01 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.01 0.01+ 0.01 0.01+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.54+ 0.50 0.54+ 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Performance below aspiration  -6.27*** -6.19*** -6.31*** -12.53*** -5.87*** -12.74*** 
(H1a)   (1.76) (1.75) (1.78) (3.65) (1.76) (3.69) 
Performance above aspiration   0.34* 0.34* 0.33* 2.27 -0.70 
(H1b)   (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (1.75) (1.41) 
Foreign competition (H2)    2.16*** 1.65** 2.18*** 1.59** 
    (0.50) (0.54) (0.50) (0.54) 
Performance below aspiration     13.30*  13.87* 
×Foreign competition (H3a)     (6.59)  (6.61) 
Performance above aspiration       -1.96 2.93 
×Foreign competition (H3b)      (4.22) (3.96) 
_cons -23.16*** -21.79*** -21.94*** -22.94*** -21.91*** -22.95*** -21.95*** 
 (2.63) (2.64) (2.64) (2.69) (2.78) (2.61) (2.76) 
N 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 
ll -1363.7 -1354.5 -1354.1 -1346.1 -1344.2 -1346.1 -1344.0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Table 14: Robustness Check-Subsample analysis 




















Firm size 1.03*** 1.07*** 0.90*** 1.04*** 0.89*** 1.03*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) 
Firm age -0.14** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Product diversification -0.24 -0.20 -0.22 0.21 -0.21 0.20 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.30) (0.19) (0.30) 
Intangible assets -0.03+ -0.03 0.01 -0.06** 0.01 -0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
State ownership -1.63*** -1.52*** -1.49*** -1.24+ -1.48*** -1.24+ 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.38) (0.65) (0.38) (0.65) 
Central government -0.44* -0.50* -0.26 -0.95* -0.25 -0.96* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.48) (0.23) (0.48) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.57** -1.51* -2.46** -0.67 -2.46** -0.69 
 (0.60) (0.61) (0.77) (1.11) (0.77) (1.12) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.59 0.47 1.10+ -0.33 1.00+ -0.31 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.58) (0.79) (0.57) (0.79) 
IJV experience 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06+ 0.01 0.06+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.12 0.36*** 0.12 0.37*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Domestic investment 0.02 0.02 0.04+ 0.002 0.04+ 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.03+ 0.02+ 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Industry concentration 1.37 0.60 -0.37 1.58 -0.56 1.40 
 (2.03) (2.04) (3.41) (3.11) (3.48) (3.04) 
Industry globalization 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.45 0.51 0.73* 0.35 0.76* 0.35 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.36) (0.47) (0.36) (0.47) 
Performance-aspiration  0.65 5.36** 0.30* 9.49** -0.51 
  (1.02) (1.71) (0.12) (3.17) (0.56) 
Foreign competition  2.20*** 2.53*** 1.26 2.02** 1.15 
  (0.56) (0.67) (1.09) (0.72) (1.08) 
Performance-aspiration     -9.01+ 2.88 
×Foreign competition      (5.21) (1.90) 
_cons -23.16*** -24.05*** -22.07*** -37.23*** -21.46*** -34.62*** 
 (2.63) (2.62) (3.84) (4.68) (3.92) (4.60) 
N 6181 6181 4766 1415 4766 1415 
ll -1363.7 -1353.9 -915.3 -378.6 -914.3 -378.3 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Table 15: Robustness Check-Exclude HK, Macau, and Caribbean tax haven 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Firm size 1.20*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 1.17*** 1.15*** 1.17*** 1.15*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Firm age -0.13** -0.12** -0.12** -0.13** -0.12** -0.13** -0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05 (0.04) 
Product diversification -0.24 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.16 -0.18 -0.17 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26 (0.25) 
Intangible assets -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
State ownership -1.12** -1.03* -1.03* -0.94* -0.89* -0.94* -0.89* 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42 
Central government -0.46+ -0.43 -0.43 -0.50+ -0.48+ -0.50 -0.48+ 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29 
BOD’s Political connections -1.23 -1.32+ -1.32+ -1.24 -1.28+ -1.23 -1.27 
 (0.75) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) (0.77) (0.76 (0.77 
BOD’s International exp. 1.07+ 1.18* 1.18* 1.01+ 0.86 1.02+ 0.87 
 (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.61 (0.60 
IJV experience -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Domestic investment -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02 (0.02 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02 (0.01) 
Industry concentration 2.35 1.72 1.74 1.05 0.47 1.06 0.47 
 (2.77) (2.76) (2.76) (2.79) (2.84) (2.78) (2.84) 
Industry globalization 0.002 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.38 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Performance below aspiration  -7.26*** -7.20*** -7.15** -13.57*** -7.10** -13.71*** 
(H1a)   (2.17) (2.16) (2.18) (3.71) (2.17) (3.73) 
Performance above aspiration   0.28* 0.28* 0.26+ -0.11 -0.49 
(H1b)   (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.73 (0.64) 
Foreign competition (H2)    2.02** 1.46+ 2.00** 1.41+ 
    (0.77) (0.79) (0.77) (0.79) 
Performance below aspiration     14.46*  14.92* 
×Foreign competition (H3a)     (6.18)  (6.16) 
Performance above aspiration       1.31 2.42 
×Foreign competition (H3b)      (2.50) (2.08) 
_cons -27.84*** -26.04*** -26.09*** -26.72*** -25.57*** -26.74*** -25.56*** 
 (3.639) (3.732) (3.731) (3.733) (3.825) (3.728) (3.819) 
N 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 
ll -973.9 -967.1 -967.0 -963.3 -961.1 -963.3 -960.9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Table 16: Robustness Check-Control for sub-national institutions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Firm size 1.01*** 0.98*** 1.00*** 1.07*** 1.03*** 1.07*** 1.03*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Firm age -0.15** -0.14*** -0.13** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15** -0.15*** 
 (0.04 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Product diversification -0.34 -0.32 -0.27 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.27 (0.28) (0.31) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) 
Intangible assets -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
State ownership -1.89*** -1.82*** -1.83*** -1.67*** -1.64*** -1.67*** -1.64*** 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) 
Central government -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.45+ -0.42+ -0.44+ -0.42+ 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.26 -1.33+ -1.38+ -1.33+ -1.35+ -1.33+ -1.35+ 
 (0.78) (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.69 0.58 0.68 0.58 
 (0.55) (0.55) (0.56) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.56) 
IJV experience 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.17* 0.16** 0.16** 0.15** 0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 
 (0.06 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Domestic investment 0.04 0.04+ 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.04* 0.04+ 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry concentration 2.78 2.83 3.11 1.95 1.52 1.90 1.52 
 (2.32 (2.32) (2.32) (2.44) (2.44) (2.41) (2.43) 
Industry globalization -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Sub-national institutions 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Performance below aspiration  -3.10* -2.89* -2.47* -10.61* -2.50* -10.61* 
(H1a)   (1.24) (1.19) (1.24) (4.65) (1.25) (4.66) 
Performance above aspiration   1.93* 2.07** 1.80** 2.43 1.82* 
(H1b)   (0.77) (0.70) (0.65) (1.56) (0.90) 
Foreign competition (H2)    2.93*** 2.35*** 2.94*** 2.36*** 
    (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) 
Performance below aspiration     16.26*  16.25* 
×Foreign competition (H3a)     (6.98)  (7.02) 
Performance above aspiration       -1.34 -0.06 
×Foreign competition (H3b)      (2.71) (1.90) 
_cons -25.31*** -24.79*** -25.62*** -27.01*** -25.29*** -26.94*** -25.30*** 
 (3.51) (3.51) (3.54) (3.61) (3.73) (3.59) (3.71) 
N 4517 4517 4517 4517 4517 4517 4517 
ll -881.7 -880.1 -878.4 -869.5 -866.6 -869.4 -866.6 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Table 17: Robustness Check-Control for previous patent flow 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Previous patent flow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm size 1.04*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Firm age -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Product diversification -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.32 -0.29 -0.25 -0.22 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) 
Intangible assets -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.13+ -0.14+ -0.13+ -0.13 -0.13+ -0.13+ -0.13+ 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
State ownership -1.68*** -1.61*** -1.61*** -1.55*** -1.53*** -1.54*** -1.52*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) 
Central government -0.51* -0.48* -0.48* -0.53* -0.52* -0.55* -0.54* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
BOD’s Political connections -1.97** -2.04** -2.04** -2.15*** -2.18*** -2.10** -2.14*** 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) 
BOD’s International exp. 0.69 0.76 0.76 0.69 0.60 0.67 0.58 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50) 
IJV experience -0.0004 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.01 -0.004 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Domestic investment 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.05** 0.04* 0.04* 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.04* 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry concentration 1.60 1.45 1.49 0.90 0.40 0.58 0.05 
 (2.14) (2.11) (2.11) (2.11) (2.18) (2.17) (2.23) 
Industry globalization 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.66+ 0.68+ 0.68+ 0.70* 0.73* 0.73* 0.76* 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) 
Performance below aspiration  -5.02** -4.97** -4.53* -9.33** -4.91** -9.38** 
(H1a)   (1.79) (1.79) (1.78) (3.08) (1.82) (3.14) 
Performance above aspiration   0.30* 1.53*** 0.31* 0.42 0.12 
(H1b)   (0.14) (0.39) (0.14) (1.06) (0.87) 
Foreign competition (H2)    2.34*** 1.94** 2.31*** 1.87** 
    (0.64) (0.66) (0.64) (0.66) 
Performance below aspiration     9.89+  10.02+ 
×Foreign competition (H3a)     (5.18)  (5.19) 
Performance above aspiration       -0.35 0.69 
×Foreign competition (H3b)      (3.76) (3.00) 
_cons -40.04*** -38.45*** -37.98*** -40.36*** -38.31*** -40.23*** -38.73*** 
 (2.814) (2.878) (2.877) (2.713) (3.036) (2.874) (3.005) 
N 5467 5467 5467 5467 5467 5467 5467 
ll -1123.6 -1118.5 -1118.1 -1113.0 -1111.5 -1111.7 -1110.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
Fixed effects of year, region and industry are included in all the models 
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4.4.3 Supplementary analysis 
As I argued above, increased foreign competition in a firm’s existing businesses will 
motivate firms performing below aspirations to take a foreign investment to change 
their situation compared to the firms in industries with the lower level of competition. 
With limited resources, these firms may relocate their resources to markets with higher 
profitability and investment efficiency, and expand their geographic scope to explore 
potential new sources of competitive advantage in low-cost offshore markets that 
strengthen their competitive capabilities at home, adding a more diverse set of locations 
to their geographic footprint (Almor et al., 2006; Dunning, 1988; Rugman & Verbeke, 
2001). Accordingly, I further analyze the role of performance aspiration and foreign 
competition on the location of OFDI especially for firms performing below their 
aspiration levels. The results are shown in Table 18.  
First, the main effect of the performance below aspiration on OFDI in developed 
and developing countries are both negative and significant. These results are consistent 
with H1a prediction. Similarly, performance above aspiration is positive and significant 
in all the models no matter in developed or developing countries. These results are 
consistent with H1b prediction. Second, effects of foreign competition are positive and 
significant for OFDI in developing and developed countries. These results provide 
support for H2. Finally, the interaction term of the performance below aspiration and 
foreign competition further support my prediction. Firms performing below aspirations 
will increase their investment in developing countries facing intense foreign 
competition and with limited resources. In other words, they will escape from their 
domestic markets to foreign countries with higher profitability and investment 
efficiency to balance their situation by developing international diversification 
opportunities, thereby reducing their vulnerability to the “attacks” by competitors. 
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Table 18: Supplementary Analysis-Location choice 
























Firm size 1.13*** 1.11*** 1.13*** 1.00*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Firm age -0.11** -0.11** -0.12** -0.15*** -0.11*** -0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Product diversification -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.19 -0.13 -0.17 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) 
Intangible assets -0.04+ -0.03 -0.04+ -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resource -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
State ownership -1.04* -1.01* -1.04* -1.66*** -1.62*** -1.65*** 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) 
Central government -0.59+ -0.58+ -0.59+ -0.35+ -0.40* -0.36+ 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
BOD’s Political connections -2.51** -2.56** -2.50** -0.52 -0.64 -0.47 
 (0.83) (0.84) (0.83) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) 
BOD’s International exp. 1.97** 1.88** 1.99** -0.29 -0.51 -0.27 
 (0.63) (0.62) (0.63) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) 
IJV experience 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous foreign subsidiaries 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) 
Domestic investment -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Distance to bankruptcy 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry concentration -3.55 -3.89 -3.54 1.88 0.77 1.53 
 (3.17) (3.19) (3.17) (1.84) (2.08) (1.87) 
Industry globalization 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.004 0.01 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry growth 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.80* 0.91** 0.79* 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) 
Performance below aspiration -7.83** -13.19** -7.72** -5.46** -9.24** -5.82** 
(H1a)  (2.68) (4.44) (2.67) (1.97) (3.18) (2.02) 
Performance above aspiration 0.32* 0.31* 0.47 1.65*** 1.621*** 1.46 
(H1b) (0.13) (0.13) (0.60) (0.30) (0.30) (1.19) 
Foreign competition (H2) 2.19* 1.75+ 2.16* 1.88** 1.55+ 1.87* 
 (1.01) (1.05) (1.01) (0.73) (0.73) (0.73) 
Performance below aspiration  12.25   9.88*  
×Foreign competition (H3a)  (7.48)   (4.52)  
Performance above aspiration    2.66   -3.83 
×Foreign competition (H3b)   (2.05)   (4.30) 
_cons -20.48*** -19.74*** -20.51*** -26.68*** -26.01*** -26.82*** 
 (3.93) (4.01) (3.93) (2.77) (2.76) (2.92) 
N 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 6181 
ll -698.3 -697.2 -698.1 -900.9 -903.6 -900.7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Fixed effects of year, region and industry are included in all the models 
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
The objective of this study is to provide and test a firm-level behavioral explanations 
for differences in firms’ propensities to engage in international expansion. I considered 
firm-level behavioral motivations to engage in foreign expansion. The basic contention 
in this study is that behavioral variables help explain internationalization after other 
firm and industry factors are controlled for. The results point to the relevance of 
performance feedback for corporate strategic decisions. Even after controlling other 
explanations, I found that firm-level behavioral characteristics played a significant role 
in explaining which firms engaged in OFDI activity. 
My theoretical arguments extend the behavioral theory of the firm  (Cyert & 
March, 1963) to the context of a corporate strategy of OFDI decision and firms from 
emerging economies. In general, I find that variables associated with problemistic and 
slack search are relevant to explaining the OFDI decisions, but the effects are not always 
in the predicted directions. There is a significant difference for firms performing below 
and above their aspiration levels in their propensity to engage in OFDI in response to 
performance feedback. I also find foreign competition in domestic markets influences 
firms’ resource allocation and focus of attention, and further influences their propensity 
for OFDI for firms performing below aspiration levels.  
According to behavioral theory, a negative attainment discrepancy should induce a 
firm to search for other viable opportunities. Rather than finding results fully consistent 
with problemistic search, I found that the propensity of OFDI increased as performance 
improved up to aspiration level, and then increased at a slower speed after exceeding 
aspiration level. The positive effect of performance aspiration on OFDI for firms 
performing above aspiration level was consistent with slack search argument. 
The effect of attainment discrepancy for below-aspiration firms deserves further 
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investigation. I proposed two reasons for this positive relationship. First, the resource 
availability might constrain their motivation. The behavioral theory of the firm did not 
consider the resource availability and capability for the firm under the situation that 
performs far below aspiration levels. The implicit assumption in prior research that 
firms have enough resources to undertake organizational change, even though their 
performance far below the aspiration level, should be released, especially for firms from 
emerging economies. Second, below aspiration performers may engage in domestic 
investment directly toward improving the performance of existing businesses in the 
home market rather than turn to a search of internationalization with limited resource. 
Managers of organizations with low performance may change them in ways other than 
internationalization, such as downsizing, productivity improvement, or diversification 
(Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Anand & Singh, 1997). Thus, the link between an 
organizational problem and foreign expansion is obscured by noise generated by 
alternate sources of solutions.  
Similar to foreign competition effects in developed markets, foreign competition 
in emerging countries also persuades firms to take OFDI. However, by further analysis 
on foreign competition effects on firms performing below and above aspiration levels, 
I find that foreign competition has a more important effect on firms performing below 
aspiration levels. First, foreign competition directly persuades these firms escape from 
the domestic market to access competitive advantages abroad. Moreover, foreign 
competition influences these firms’ resource allocation and focus of attention, which 
further influence their propensity for OFDI. Moreover, by analyzing the effects of 
performance aspiration on the location of OFDI, I find that firms performing below 
aspirations will increase their OFDI in developing countries.  
This study points to the need for a behavior understanding of OFDI activity in 
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particular and corporate strategy in general. Overall, the empirical results indicate the 
potential of behavioral variables to add to researchers’ ability to explain 
internationalization decisions. Further research is necessary to explore more fully the 
applicability of behavioral theory to corporate phenomena. Also, for the international 
business area, future research could analyze if firms performing above or below 
aspirations might have different strategies in their foreign expansion like ownership 
strategy. Moreover, this study is in China but has more general implications. Future 
















CHAPTER FIVE: CHINESE FIRMS’ OUTWARD FDI AND INNOVATION 
5.1 Introduction 
Technological capabilities have long been recognized as the main driver of economic 
growth and an important source of competitive advantage for firms (Porter, 1990; Teece, 
1986). Thus, developing technological capabilities has been an important objective for 
indigenous firms in emerging markets like China (Amsden, 2001; Bell & Pavitt, 1995). 
Emerging market firms, however, typically lag behind their counterparts in developed 
markets in technological development (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). From a value 
chain perspective, while more knowledge-intensive, higher value-added activities such 
as R&D and marketing tend to concentrate in developed markets, less knowledge-
intensive, lower value-added activities such as repetitious and standardized 
manufacturing and services tend to be located in emerging markets (Ernst & Kim, 2002). 
Thus, as latecomers to their industries relative to their counterparts in developed 
markets, emerging market firms like China have strong incentives to acquire the 
resources and catch up in their innovative capabilities that will help them to compete in 
higher value-added activities (Mathews, 2002; Mudambi, 2008). 
From the organization learning perspective, both exploitation and exploration 
involve different aspects of organizational learning, yet are equally essential for 
organizational survival and prosperity. Many studies (Lecraw, 1983; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Makino & Delios, 1996) propose that firms engaging in FDI are not only to transfer 
their resources to a host country, but also to access the necessary strategic assets in the 
host country. In support of this perspective, a growing amount of literature has 
suggested that much of inward Japanese FDI in the U.S. is motivated by strategic asset-




found that newly industrialized economies (NIE) firms engage in FDI in a developed 
country when they intend to seek technology-based resources and skills. Also, EM 
MNEs use outward investments as a springboard to acquire strategic assets needed to 
compete more effectively against global rivals (Luo & Tung, 2007). Accordingly, OFDI 
is an important learning method for MNEs in searching strategic assets in foreign 
markets. 
Even though the effects of international diversification on innovation is not new, 
this study is different from literature in two perspectives. First, based on organizational 
learning theory and resource-based view, Hitt et al. (1997) propose a positive effect of 
international diversification on firm innovation because international diversification 
provides firms with incentives to invest in innovation, resources to invest in innovation, 
and greater returns from innovation. Different from these developed market firms, 
emerging market MNEs are latecomers in technological capabilities and international 
diversification is their method to close this gap and improve their technological 
capabilities.  
Second, evolutionary theories of the MNE suggest that knowledge and assets 
accessed and assimilated from foreign locations enrich the firm’s knowledge bases 
which can lead to enhanced innovation performance (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Kogut 
& Zander, 1993). Nevertheless, these studies have focused on the gains accrued at the 
subsidiary level and, therefore, as a result, we know little about whether and how the 
knowledge acquired in foreign markets could affect the innovation performance of the 
parent firm of the MNEs.  
In this essay, I propose that it is important to analyze the effects of OFDI in 
developed markets on emerging market MNEs’ parent firm innovation capabilities. I 
also expect to analyze how the performance relative to aspirations and industry 
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competition influence the relationship between outward FDI in developed countries and 
firms’ innovation. I test my theoretical arguments using a dataset that consists of a 
comprehensive sample of Chinese manufacturing firms listed on the mainboard of 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Exchange over the period 2002-2010.  
 
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Knowledge is the important component to a company’s innovation (Grant, 1996). 
Based on the literature on the innovation of firms in developed countries, companies 
can generate the requisite knowledge for innovation internally through in-house 
research and development (R&D) and marketing and externally through channels such 
as strategic alliances and acquisitions (Ahuja, 2000; Danneels, 2002). Adapting this 
framework to the emerging market context, Chinese firms could in principle focus on 
internal innovation to catch up with technology leaders in developed markets. However, 
they may not have the necessary resources or capabilities for internal development (Li 
et al., 2010). Alternatively, Chinese firms can invest in developed markets to tap 
advanced technological knowledge (Mudambi, 2008). This catch-up strategy is viewed 
as a ‘springboard’ to overcome Chinese MNEs’ latecomer disadvantages in 
technological areas (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
 
5.2.1 Relationship between OFDI and innovation in home country 
Conducting outward FDI to seek technological knowledge and enhance innovative 
capabilities is not a new phenomenon, nor is it unique to Chinese MNEs. Chinese MNEs, 
when investing in developed markets with a comparative technology advantage, can 
benefit from knowledge spillovers in these markets. First, Chinese MNEs, via 
acquisitions of technologies or companies in developed markets, can gain direct access 
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to sophisticated technologies and skilled labor. Second, Chinese MNEs can benefit from 
knowledge spillovers of local suppliers, customers, competitors and research 
institutions by establishing formal or informal network ties with them when they set up 
a foreign subsidiary in these markets (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2011). Such network ties 
not only increase the frequency and intensity of information exchange between Chinese 
MNEs and local knowledge holders in developed markets, but also allow Chinese 
MNEs to identify and recruit persons who can bring critical technological knowledge 
transfer from local knowledge holders to Chinese MNEs (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1993; 
Saxenian, 1991; Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003). 
Even though Chinese MNEs share the same targets with other firms in accessing 
and learning strategic assets in host countries, they are still different from the MNEs of 
Japan and newly industrialized economies (NIE). For MNEs from Japan and NIE, 
outward investments have been driven mainly by “push” factors, such as small, 
saturated domestic markets, rising labor shortages, escalating operating costs, and 
growing current-account surpluses. OFDI by Chinese multinationals, in contrast, has 
been triggered primarily by “pull” factors, such as raised foreign exchange income, 
penetrating new markets, securing supplies of key natural resources, circumventing 
host country trade barriers, and acquiring strategic assets. Following this logic, even 
though Chinese MNEs actively go abroad to search resources, a huge domestic market 
still attractive and important for them. Access to a wide range of external resources is a 
critical ingredient for improving Chinese MNEs’ innovative capability and increasing 
the firms’ bargaining power in domestic markets. These firms may channel back their 
capabilities and resources to upgrade their domestic manufacturing and compete against 
rivals in a strong position in domestic markets.  
Chinese MNEs may pursue developed market investment primarily to repatriate 
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intangible strategic assets to their home markets (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Luo & Tung, 
2007; Rui & Yip, 2008). In this scenario, they are not always initially looking to 
compete directly in international markets or develop the necessary cutting-edge R&D 
capabilities to do so (Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2012). Rather, OFDI may lead to 
reverse knowledge transfer of technologies that can be rapidly put into production in 
the domestic market. Indeed, the idea Chinese MNEs use ‘knowledge accessing’ 
strategies, in which they look to repatriate the strategic assets of developed markets 
MNEs so that they can be imitated using lower cost production techniques, has recently 
received some support (Awate et al., 2012). 
 One potentially important explanation for Chinese firms undertaking OFDI, 
therefore, is not to develop firm-specific advantages for international competition. 
Rather, OFDI is seen as a means of transferring various capabilities, expertise and 
technologies back to the domestic market which is used to compete in the developed 
market MNEs domestically (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012). For large emerging 
markets such as China, developing stronger domestic market positions could be 
considered an important driver of such asset-seeking behavior (Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Ramamurti, 2012). Accordingly, I propose that  
Hypothesis 1: Chinese MNE’s outward FDI in developed countries positively affects its 
number of a patent filed in the home country. 
 
5.2.2 Moderating effect of performance aspiration 
Numerous factors determine an MNE’s capability to not only acquire foreign strategic 
assets but also, more importantly, to absorb and harness such assets. Interactions 
between performance below aspirations and OFDI in developed markets influence both 
the willingness and the ability of firms to improve innovation capabilities. First, effects 
96 
 
of OFDI in developed markets on a willingness to improve innovation capabilities are 
likely weaker for firms performing below aspiration levels. Organizational search can 
be conducted in both the market domain and the technology domain (Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001). Organizational search in the market domain is conducted by adding 
products to obtain a wider market position or adding customers to get a deeper market 
penetration. Firms in developing economies face an environment in which factors such 
as lower income and literacy levels result in slower product diffusion and lower final 
penetration than in developed nations (Talukdar, Sudhir, & Ainslie, 2002). Such 
conditions increase the firm’s dependence on marketing volume and approach for its 
sales penetration and make marketing a likely target of management attention when the 
firm’s performance is below the aspiration level. Thus, one would expect such firms to 
respond to the low performance by searching new markets.  
In contrast, R&D intensity is adjusted in response to performance across a wide 
range of industries in developed economies (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007). This is 
because search through R&D can solve performance problems stemming from outdated 
product lines. The risk of product line obsolescence is high in developed economies 
because of the high competition and frequent use of technological advances as 
competitive weapons. Emerging economy firms face a different situation because they 
can often make faster and more predictable technological progress by licensing 
technologies from firms that are more advanced. So, it is not obvious that internal R&D 
search is the natural response of an emerging economy firm that has performance 
problems. Accordingly, although market and technology search both have effects in the 
short and long terms, managers may see market search as a quicker route to improved 
performance, given the long lead times common in R&D. 
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The interaction between performance below aspiration and OFDI in developed 
markets can also influence firms’ ability to improve innovation capabilities. Firms 
performing below aspiration levels are less capable of responding to and exploiting the 
advanced knowledge in foreign markets, which hinder their ability to innovate. Thus, 
firms performing below aspiration levels have fewer opportunities to access strategic 
assets in foreign expansion and transfer them back to home country. I propose that it 
negatively moderate the relationship between OFDI in developed markets and firm 
innovation.  
Hypothesis 2a: Firms’ performance relative to aspiration levels (below aspirations) 
negatively moderate the effect of outward FDI in developed markets on its number of a 
patent filed in the home country. 
 
Firms with positive performance feedback are likely to reduce their attention 
toward the problemistic search because they already are in a fully satisfactory position 
regarding their simplified representation of performance. In contrast, these firms will 
pay attention to slack search by using their resources to further develop competitive 
advantages. As firm performance exceed aspiration level, these firms have capabilities 
to take risky investment in technological seeking. Also, this is the efficient way for them 
to further develop competitive advantages and improve their performance. Moreover, 
firms performing above aspirations have the higher capability to bridge distant 
technological contexts and acquire complementary assets to develop new capabilities 
based on their slack resources. Thus, I propose the following for firms performing 
above aspiration levels:  
98 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms’ performance relative to aspiration levels (above aspirations) 
positively moderate the effect of outward FDI in developed countries on its rate of 
launching innovations. 
 
5.2.3 Moderating effect of industry competition 
Traditional industrial organization thinking emphasizes that a firm’ strategy and 
performance depends on the conditions within a given industry (Porter, 1990). In the 
first essay in analyzing the determinant of Chinese firms’ OFDI, I focused on the effects 
of firms’ exposure to foreign competition in the home market. Some studies have begun 
to explore this issue and proposed that foreign competition in the domestic market 
increase firms’ OFDI no matter from ‘global focusing’ strategy perspective (Wiersema 
& Bowen, 2008) or ‘escape hypothesis’ perspective (Hutzschenreuter & Grone, 2009). 
Because foreign competition influence firms’ aspiration for foreign investment, 
understanding of foreign market, and capability in competing with foreign firms in 
global markets, it is reasonable to analyze its effect on OFDI decision. However, when 
I examine the firms’ innovation outputs in domestic markets, it is obvious I should pay 
attention to the overall industry competition instead of focusing on foreign competition 
in domestic markets.  
 The literature on industrial organization emphasizes the role of a firm’s competitive 
environment. The gradual erosion of government-imposed entry barriers leads to an 
environment of ‘hyper competition’ that was previously unseen in some industries. The 
increasing competitive pressure acted as a selection mechanism. Firms that were more 
efficient became even stronger and were able to compete in global markets. For firms 
in fiercely competitive industries, to maintain cost advantages they must implement  
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innovation that reduces costs in the organization (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). I expect 
that firms that operate in home industries with higher competition are more likely to 
strengthen their cost or technological advantages.  
Hypothesis 3: The greater the competition in an industry in the Chinese MNE’s home 
country, the higher the (positive) effect of outward FDI in developed markets on its rate 




The dataset was compiled from several sources. First, I obtained the basic information 
and financial data on listed firms from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database, which is considered a reliable database. I exclude firms 
in the service sector as service firms are different from manufacturing firms in their 
financial structures and ways of measuring their innovation (Lien et al., 2005). Thus, 
the sample consists of 832 firms. Next, I manually collect information on overseas 
subsidiaries from listed firms’ annual reports for 2002-2010. I choose 2002 as the 
starting year because FDI from China surged after China’s access to the WTO in 2001 
(MOFCOM, 2009). I define a subsidiary as any entity where the listed firm holds at 
least 20% of the equity. In annual reports required by Chinese authority, 20% of equity 
is the threshold of disclosure of subsidiaries. I identify the establishment of an overseas 
subsidiary by comparing full subsidiary lists of a given firm for consecutive years. If 
an overseas subsidiary appeared in firm i’s annual report of year t but not in that of year 
t-1, I further check the annual report and other documents about the firm for year t to 
confirm the establishment year for the subsidiary.   
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Patent data in China is available on the SIPO website. It provides formatted data 
covering all patent applications since 1985 when China established its patent system 
and provides detailed patent application information. I obtained the patent data on listed 
firms from Chinese Patent Database, which is developed by several scholars. Following 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) pioneering work matching USPTO patents to Compustat 
(listed) firms, these scholars generated the Chinese Patent Database matching China’s 
State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) patent information with listed firms. Because 
the database only matched the listed firms on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Exchange, finally, the sample for this essay consists of 638 manufacturing firms from 
2002 to 2010. In this dissertation, I limit my research to invention patents because they 
represent innovations of high quality, whereas no substantial examination is required 
for the other two types of patents, utility models, and design patents. 
Industry-level data were obtained from the WIND database, a database that is 
widely regarded as one of the most comprehensive and authoritative data sources in 
China (Peng et al., 2008), and China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology. 
I use one-year lag for all the explanatory variables to avoid possible endogeneity with 
the dependent variable. 
 
5.3.2 Dependent variable 
To measure the firms’ innovation output, I use the number of patents granted to the 
parent firm each year during the sample period. As I interpreted filing a patent 
application that was eventually granted as producing the patent, I specify the years for 
the granted patents to the filing year. Because the sample period for the database ends 
in 2010, I could guarantee the granted decisions for all the patent filed. Also, my 
measure captures the “flow” rather than the stock of patents. 
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5.3.3 Independent and moderating variables 
To better capture the value of Chinese firms’ foreign investment, I measured the firms’ 
outward FDI as the registered amount of money in developed countries each year. Then, 
I take the log of the investments amount. Table 19 shows the lists of developed countries  
Similar to the first essay, following Cyert and March (1963), I computed aspiration 
level (A) as a mixture of social and historical aspiration levels. The social aspiration 
level (SA) is the average of other firms’ performance (P), calculated as the mean ROA 
of all firms in the same three-digit industry. The historical aspiration (HA) level is a 
mixture of past-period historical aspiration level and the previous performance of the 
focal firm. Letting α1 and α2 be weights, the formulas are: 
Ati= α1SAti + (1- α1) HAti 
SAti=∑Ptj /no. of firms in the industry 
HAti= α2Pt-1 + (1- α2) HAt-1, i 
Here, t is time, and i and j indicate firm. I estimated the weights by searching all 
parameter values by increments of 0.1 and taking the combination giving the highest 
model “log-likelihood”. This procedure yielded a value of 0.1 for α1 and a value of 0.9 
for α2. To distinguish between the situations where performance above and below a 
firm’s aspiration level, I specified performance as a spline function (Greene, 2003) of 
firm performance relative to their aspiration level, with a knot at 0: performance-
aspiration>0 for the cases where performance is above the aspiration level, and 
performance-aspiration<0 for cases where performance is below the aspiration level. I 
take the absolute value for performance below aspirations.  
Industry competition. I measured it based on the Annual Census data. Specifically, 
it is measured as one minus the Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index equals the 
squared sum of sales percentages of firms in each three-digit industry. I rescale the 
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industry competition proxy by multiplying it by 100 so that a high value reflects a 
highly competitive industry.  
 
5.3.4 Control variables 
I included several firm-level time-varying control variables that may also influence a 
firm’s innovation: firm size, age, product diversification, intangible assets, slack 
resources, state ownership, international joint venture (IJV) experience, previous 
foreign experience, quality of the previous patent, board size, CEO duality, and 
ownership concentration. I controlled for firm size since larger firms typically have 
more slack resources for innovation, which is measured by the logarithm of a firm’s 
total assets. Firm age was controlled for as a proxy for experience and resources. Hitt 
et al. (1997) found that product diversification influences a firms’ innovation outputs. 
To control for its possible effect, I include this variable, measured by Entropy index 
approach which is conventionally applied to calculate diversification and considers the 
number of industries the firms participates in, the proportion of sales from each 
industrial sector. Accordingly, product diversification is measured as ∑pi * ln (1/Pi), 
where Pi is the proportion of sales in industry i. I also included the logarithm of 
intangible assets to control for the impact of firms’ technological capability on firms’ 
innovation. According to the Chinese accounting standards, intangible assets are 
defined as long-term non-monetary assets without physical forms held by enterprises, 
including patents, non-patent technology, trademarks, copyrights, land use rights and 
concessions.  
To control for the effect of slack resources, I measured it as the ratio of debt to 
assets (Bromiley, 1991). Since greater debt gives lower borrowing ability, the prediction 
for this measure is a negative coefficient. Following previous literature, I adopted a 
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three-step procedure to develop the measurement for state ownership. First, following 
prior studies (Delios et al., 2006), I captured the ownership type of a listed firm’s largest 
ten shareholders. Second, I coded the state ownership regarding the ratio of shares held 
by this shareholder if the shareholder’s ownership type is an SOE; otherwise, its state 
ownership is coded as ‘0.’ Third, I summed all the shareholders’ proportion of SOE 
shares. For IJV experience, I developed a count measure to capture Chines firms’ 
involvement in IJVs established with foreign firms in the home country. To control for 
firms’ previous international experience, which influences firms’ further investment in 
foreign markets, I measured the number of OFDI projects by the firms accumulated to 
year t. 
There are several methods to analyze the quality of patents, such as patent citation, 
renewal data, and international patent classification (IPC). The most widely used patent 
quality indicator is the number of forward citations (Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003; 
Trajtenberg, 1990). The relationship between citation and patent value are empirically 
confirmed (Albert, Avery, Narin, & McAllister, 1991; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, & Vopel, 
1999; Trajtenberg, 1990). Unfortunately, SIPO does not document citation information. 
By using patent renewal data to measure the quality, the major limitation is the 
inadequate timeliness. Accordingly, I measure the quality of the patent by adopting the 
conventional approach based on the concentration of patent technology classes (Huang 
& Murray, 2009; Jia et al., 2015; Trajtenberg, Henderson, & Jaffe, 1997). Following 
this approach, I first constructed a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) using the 
concentration of patent technology classes for each patent applications for the firms. 
For example, a patent technology class includes A23, A61, and A61.The Herfindahl 
index is calculated as (1/3)2+ (2/3)2=5/9. Then, I take the average of all the patent 
applications per firm as the quality of their patent. The lower the level of HHI means a 
104 
 
higher novelty patent application.  
I controlled board size that was measured by the number of directors because board 
size may reflect the diversity of board members’ background and information sources 
and potentially affect firms’ international expansion (Puffer, McCarthy, Jaeger, et al., 
2013). I also included the effects of CEO duality by a dummy variable (1=the same 
person for both CEO and chairman position, 0=two different persons), since that duality 
may determine a firm’s willingness to take a risk in pursuing a short-term or long-term 
goal (Peng et al., 2010). For ownership concentration, it was measured by the no. of 
shares the largest shareholder has. The information of directors, CEO and ownership 
concentration was obtained from CSMAR.  
I also controlled several industry level variables. Industry growth was measured by 
the annual growth of sales in the industries. Moreover, given that consistent firm-level 
data on R&D intensity are not widely available in China, I use industry R&D intensity 
as a proxy. This variable is measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales of 
an industry in which a firm operates. To measure the foreign competition in the domestic 
market, I used the number of employees in all foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) 
divided by the number of employees in all enterprises in an industry to measure the 
foreign competition.  
I used a set of year dummy variables to capture omitted variables that evolve over 
time. I also fixed the effects of sub-national regions by including dummy variables 
using two-digit area codes for provinces, autonomous regions, and centrally 
administered cities and the industry dummies to control for industry effects. 
 
5.3.5 Model estimation 
The use of count of foreign subsidiaries as the dependent variable proposes the use of 
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a count model, such as a negative binomial (NB) or Poisson model. The NB model is 
more appropriate because the distribution of OFDI counts in our sample indicates over 
dispersion and Poisson model requires the standard deviation of the dependent variables 
is closed to the mean (Greene, 2003). However, standard NB model cannot handle the 
presence of excess zero counts in OFDI data. In contrast, a zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression model (ZINB) may be a better estimation technique to deal with 
this problem. Following Greene (2003) recommendation to apply the Vuong test 
(Vuong, 1989), one can determine whether the ZINB model better describes the data 
than standard NB model. The Vuong Z-score in this study has a significant and positive 
value, confirming that the ZINB model is a better choice in analyzing innovation 
outputs in essay 2. Similarly, I use the AIC test to compare the negative binomial model 
with ZINB model. The results show that AIC favors the ZINB model. 
 




























































5.4.1 Hypotheses testing 
Table 20 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for all variables used 
in this study. I present the empirical testing results for innovation output in Table 21. I 
employ the zero-inflated negative binomial model to test the effects of firms’ 
internationalization on their innovation output in the home country. Model 1 in Table 
21 is the base model with all the control variables. I take 1-year lag for all explanatory 
variables. To observe changes in the explanatory power, I sequentially add the 
independent variables in the models.   
 I predict a positive relationship between OFDI in developed countries and their 
innovation output in the home market in Hypothesis 1. I add the variable OFDI in the 
developed country in Model 2 Table 21. The coefficient is positive and significant, 
which provides support for Hypothesis 1. Thus, Chinese firms’ foreign investment in 
developed countries will increase their innovation output in the home market. I put the 
interaction of OFDI in the developed country with performance below aspiration in 
model 3 and with performance above aspiration in model 4 separately. The coefficient 
of interaction term of OFDI in the developed country and performance below aspiration 
is negative and significant, which consistent with Hypothesis 2a’s prediction. 
Accordingly, for Chinese MNEs in developed countries, performance below and 
deviates from aspiration levels will decrease the influence of OFDI on innovation 
output. Meanwhile, the interaction of OFDI in the developed country and performance 
above aspiration in model 4 is not significant. Thus, hypothesis 2b is not supported.  
Figure 7 demonstrates the moderating effect performance below aspiration based 
on Model 3 in Table 21. I plot the relationship between Chinese MNEs’ foreign 
investment in developed countries and their innovation outputs in the home country 
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using the different level of performance below aspirations (1 standard deviation above 
and below mean for performance above and below aspirations). The downward slope 
for lower performance (deviates from aspiration level) conforms to my prediction of 
the moderating effect in Hypothesis 2a. 
 Hypothesis 3 posits that the impact of OFDI on firms’ innovation output will be 
strengthened as firms’ home country industry competition increases. To test the 
hypothesis, I construct an interaction between the OFDI in the developed country and 
industry competition in model 5. The positive and significant coefficient confirms the 
hypothesis.  
 Figure 8 demonstrates the moderating effect of industry competition based on 
Model 5 in Table 21. I plot the relationships between Chinese MNEs’ foreign 
investment in developed countries and their innovation outputs in the home country 
using the different level of industry competition. The steeper slope for high industry 
competition (1 standard deviation above the mean) conforms to my prediction of a 





Table 20: Description and correlation (Essay 2) 
 Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Innovation 2.89 13.06 1          
2.OFDI in developed country 0.32 2.24 0.105 1         
3.Performance below aspiration 0.05 0.08 -0.021 -0.029 1        
4.Performance above aspiration 0.01 0.03 -0.002 0.024 -0.183 1       
5.Industry competition 0.61 0.48 0.008 -0.020 0.054 0.008 1      
6.Firm size 21.43 1.12 0.125 0.158 -0.175 -0.011 0.032 1     
7.Firm age 11.35 4.57 0.001 0.031 0.190 -0.019 0.079 -0.007 1    
8.Product diversification 0.29 0.40 -0.025 -0.023 0.028 -0.056 0.034 -0.027 0.087 1   
9.Intangible asset 16.31 4.70 0.028 0.075 0.033 -0.050 0.053 0.181 0.177 0.114 1  
10.Slack resource -0.30 1.89 -0.013 -0.022 -0.120 0.102 -0.017 -0.223 -0.075 -0.042 -0.111 1 
11.State ownership 0.30 0.26 -0.005 -0.024 -0.134 0.005 -0.051 0.170 -0.406 -0.146 -0.133 -0.028 
12.IJV experience 0.79 2.50 0.030 0.127 -0.001 -0.014 0.005 0.210 0.209 0.072 0.116 -0.067 
13.Previous foreign experience 1.20 8.56 0.108 0.174 0.006 -0.004 0.025 0.180 0.091 0.074 0.072 -0.036 
14.Previous patent quality 0.39 0.44 0.065 0.111 -0.067 -0.004 0.021 0.329 0.082 0.074 0.144 -0.016 
15.Board size 9.72 2.23 0.078 0.005 -0.020 0.013 0.002 0.226 -0.023 -0.012 0.046 -0.097 
16.CEO duality 0.25 0.43 -0.014 -0.010 0.001 0.013 -0.011 -0.025 0.016 -0.020 -0.042 0.018 
17.Ownership concentration 39.24 16.12 -0.003 0.003 -0.149 0.049 -0.058 0.212 -0.429 -0.142 -0.151 0.012 
18.Foreign competition 0.24 0.20 0.111 0.055 0.047 0.002 -0.033 -0.026 0.199 0.039 0.072 0.015 
19.Industry growth 22.51 10.41 -0.022 0.004 -0.056 -0.012 0.079 0.048 -0.044 0.007 -0.023 -0.053 
20.Industry R&D intensity 1.41 0.72 0.020 0.010 -0.113 0.078 0.051 -0.045 -0.035 -0.019 0.028 0.048 
 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11.State ownership 1          
12.IJV experience -0.115 1         
13.Previous foreign experience -0.079 0.172 1        
14.Previous patent quality -0.018 0.141 0.121 1       
15.Board size 0.065 0.036 0.034 0.071 1      
16.CEO duality -0.015 -0.004 -0.040 -0.038 0.008 1     
17.Ownership concentration 0.576 -0.089 -0.083 -0.007 -0.023 -0.007 1    
18.Foreign competition -0.128 0.113 0.155 0.148 -0.025 -0.024 -0.157 1   
19.Industry growth 0.109 -0.029 -0.044 -0.012 0.014 -0.003 0.028 -0.102 1  
20.Industry R&D intensity 0.089 -0.091 -0.007 0.109 0.033 -0.069 0.013 0.099 0.113 1 
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Table 21: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression on innovation 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
       
Firm size 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.64*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Firm age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Product diversification -0.26* -0.26** -0.27** -0.26** -0.26** -0.27** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Technological capability -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Slack resource 0.06* 0.07* 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
State ownership 0.34* 0.36* 0.37* 0.37* 0.37* 0.37* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
IJV experience -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Foreign experience 0.02* 0.02+ 0.02* 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Previous innovation quality 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Board size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CEO duality 0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Ownership concentration -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Foreign competition 3.77* 3.77* 3.78* 3.77* 3.67* 3.68* 
 (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) 
Industry growth -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Performance below aspiration  -1.55** -1.46* -1.34* -1.49** -1.45* -1.35* 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.57) 
Performance above aspiration 0.39 0.22 0.05 -0.17 0.14 -0.06 
 (1.21) (1.20) (1.21) (1.22) (1.20) (1.24) 
Industry concentration -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.27+ -0.27+ 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
OFDI in developed country (H1)  0.03** 0.05*** 0.02+ 0.002 0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
OFDI in developed country (H2a)   -0.71***   -0.64*** 
×Performance below aspiration    (0.16)   (0.17) 
OFDI in developed country (H2b)    0.52  0.10 
×Performance above aspiration    (0.50)  (0.29) 
OFDI in developed country (H3)     0.04*** 0.04** 
×Industry concentration     (0.01) (0.01) 
_cons -17.56*** -17.29*** -17.23*** -17.27*** -17.22*** -17.17*** 
 (1.64) (1.54) (1.51) (1.56) (1.54) (1.51) 
N 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 
ll -6933.0 -6929.9 -6926.2 -6928.9 -6928.2 -6925.0 
Incremental χ2 to model 1  6.35** 13.74*** 8.21* 9.71** 16.02** 
Incremental χ2 to model 2   7.40** 1.86 3.36* 9.67** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Fixed effects of year, region, and industry are included in all models 
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5.4.2 Robustness Check 
I conduct further sensitivity analyses to test the resulting robustness. One possibility for 
the main effects results could be firms’ outstanding financial resources. Firms’ slack 
financial resources could lead to higher foreign investment and innovation at the same 
time. Meanwhile, the effects of OFDI on innovation output need longer time to become 
obvious. Also, firms with higher innovation performance may further enter developed 
markets, causing concerns of endogeneity which threatens the empirical strategy. I 
control for the possible estimation biases in several ways. First, I alleviated this 
potential source of bias by including several variables that account for firm 
characteristics. I also used lagged independent variables to reduce the potential 
endogeneity bias, if any. Accordingly, I take two-year lag and three year lag of Chinese 
MNEs’ OFDI to further test their effects on firms’ innovation outputs in Table 22. The 
results on the effects of OFDI in the developed country on innovation output are 
consistent in all the models in Table 22. These results provide further support for my 
prediction that Chinese MNEs’ foreign investment in developed markets could improve 
their innovation outputs in the home country.  
 Further, reverse causality problems may exist in the analysis as higher innovative 
capability could further persuade firms to invest in developed markets. To address the 
reverse causality issue, I employ the two-stage least square method to deal with the 
issue of endogeneity. Since it is difficult to carry out negative binomial regression 
model using instrumental variables, the first step is to apply logarithm transformation 
to the dependent variable, the number of patents granted. Then I run the fixed effect 
model using the specification in Table 23. The results from the fixed effect model are 
very similar to those from the ZINB regression, as shown in Table 21. The second stage 
involves choosing a valid instrument for the OFDI variable. I then used firms’ foreign 
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currency deposits because this variable is associated with the internationalization, but 
not directly related to innovation. After the first stage as shown in Table 24, F test of 
excluded instrument shows F=19.97. Anderson-Rubin Wald test also provide strong 
support for this instrument variable (F=85.06, p<0.0001). Table 25 shows the results 
for the second stage. Finally, I replace the independent variable to count of OFDI 
projects and further test the hypotheses. The results in Table 26 show consistent results.  
 
5.4.3 Supplementary Analysis 
In addition to the main analysis and robustness check, I also do some supplementary 
analyses. First, I examine the effects of OFDI on the quality of patent. Except the 
amount of patent, quality is another significant perspective for innovation. Previous 
literature usually uses patent citation to measure the quality. Because of the data 
limitation in Chinese innovation dataset that is no citation data at this stage, I measure 
the quality of the patent by adopting the conventional approach based on the 
concentration of patent technology classes (Huang & Murray, 2009; Jia et al., 2015; 
Trajtenberg et al., 1997). As shown in Table 27, the direct effect of OFDI in a developed 
country is significant in Model 2 and 3. It shows that OFDI in developed countries also 
affects firms’ innovation quality in their home country.  
 Second, I further test the effects of OFDI in developing countries on firms’ 
innovation output. As shown in Table 28, OFDI in developing countries has a negative 
effect on firms’ innovation. The reason behind this relationship is that with limited 
resources, investment in OFDI would decrease firms’ development in innovation as 
they could not get updated knowledge from their OFDI in developing countries. These 
results further support my main argument that OFDI in developed countries could 
increase firms’ innovation output in their home country.  
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Table 22: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression on innovation (lag three years) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Firm size 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.62*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Firm age -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Product diversification -0.26** -0.25** -0.24* -0.22* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Technological capability -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Slack resource 0.07* 0.06* 0.07* 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
State ownership 0.36* 0.32* 0.27 0.30+ 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
IJV experience -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Foreign experience 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Previous innovation quality 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Board size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CEO duality 0.18* 0.14+ 0.10 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ownership concentration -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Performance below aspiration  -1.46* -1.59** -1.40* -1.30* 
 (0.58) (0.57) (0.59) (0.59) 
Performance above aspiration 0.22 -0.19 0.26 -0.38 
 (1.20) (1.16) (1.27) (1.18) 
Foreign competition 3.77* 4.11* 2.64 2.24 
 (1.50) (1.60) (1.94) (1.92) 
Industry concentration -0.25 -0.29 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.31) (0.32) 
Industry growth -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.24+ 0.20 0.28+ 0.28+ 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
OFDI in developed country (lag one year) 0.03**   0.04*** 
 (0.01)   (0.01) 
OFDI in developed country (lag two years)  0.02*  0.02* 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
OFDI in developed country (lag three years)   0.03* 0.03* 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
_cons -17.29*** -17.66*** -18.99*** -18.05*** 
 (1.54) (1.46) (1.42) (1.46) 
N 5315 4843 4207 4207 
ll -6929.9 -6582.1 -5958.0 -5953.7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Table 23: Effects of OFDI on innovation (OLS model with fixed effects) 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
       
Firm size 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Firm age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Product diversification -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Technological capability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Slack resource -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
State ownership 0.11+ 0.12+ 0.11+ 0.12+ 0.12+ 0.12+ 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
IJV experience -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.002+ -0.002+ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign experience 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Previous innovation quality 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Board size 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO duality 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ownership concentration -0.002+ -0.002+ -0.002 -0.002+ -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Performance below aspiration  -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Performance above aspiration -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Foreign competition 2.02*** 2.03*** 2.02*** 2.03*** 1.93*** 1.93*** 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Industry concentration -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Industry growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
OFDI in developed country (H1)  0.007* 0.01** 0.007* -0.007 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) 
OFDI in developed country (H2a)   -0.16*   -0.17* 
×Performance below aspiration    (0.07)   (0.08) 
OFDI in developed country (H2b)    0.02  -0.15 
×Performance above aspiration    (0.12)  (0.13) 
OFDI in developed country (H3)     0.03*** 0.03*** 
×Industry concentration     (0.01) (0.01) 
_cons -3.79*** -3.76*** -3.76*** -3.76*** -3.71*** -3.71*** 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
N 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 
ll -3973.7 -3971.6 -3968.9 -3971.5 -3960.3 -3957.4 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Fixed effects of year, region, and industry are included in all models  
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Table 24:2SLS-first stage 
 Model 1 
Foreign currency deposits  0.014*** 
 (0.003) 
Firm size 0.189*** 
 (0.041) 
Firm age 0.003 
 (0.010) 
Product diversification -0.227** 
 (0.073) 
Technological capability 0.019*** 
 (0.003) 
Slack resource 0.007 
 (0.008) 
State ownership -0.328* 
 (0.158) 
IJV experience 0.013* 
 (0.005) 
Foreign experience 0.030* 
 (0.015) 
Previous innovation quality 0.205** 
 (0.070) 
Board size -0.040** 
 (0.014) 
CEO duality -0.018 
 (0.066) 
Ownership concentration 0.001 
 (0.003) 
Performance below aspiration  0.209 
 (0.257) 
Performance above aspiration 1.594* 
 (0.806) 
Foreign competition 0.061 
 (0.231) 
Industry concentration -0.080 
 (0.079) 
Industry growth 0.006+ 
 (0.004) 





Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 25:2SLS-second stage 
 Model 1 
OFDI in developed country  0.877*** 
 (0.210) 
Firm size 0.029 
 (0.055) 
Firm age -0.005 
 (0.009) 
Product diversification 0.124 
 (0.080) 
Technological capability -0.020*** 
 (0.005) 
Slack resource 0.013 
 (0.009) 
State ownership 0.289* 
 (0.144) 
IJV experience -0.014** 
 (0.005) 
Foreign experience -0.013 
 (0.014) 
Previous innovation quality 0.410*** 
 (0.077) 
Board size 0.044** 
 (0.014) 
CEO duality 0.084 
 (0.062) 
Ownership concentration -0.002 
 (0.003) 
Performance below aspiration  -0.242 
 (0.247) 
Performance above aspiration -0.922 
 (0.692) 
Foreign competition 0.566** 
 (0.219) 
Industry concentration 0.061 
 (0.075) 
Industry growth -0.007+ 
 (0.004) 






Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 26: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression on innovation (count of OFDI 
project) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Firm size 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Firm age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Product diversification -0.26* -0.26** -0.26** -0.25** -0.26** -0.26** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Technological capability -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Slack resource 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
State ownership 0.34* 0.36* 0.36* 0.37* 0.36* 0.37* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
IJV experience -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Foreign experience 0.02* 0.02+ 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Previous innovation quality 1.589*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Board size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CEO duality 0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 0.19* 0.18* 0.18* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Ownership concentration -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Performance below aspiration  -1.55** -1.51** -1.40* -1.52** -1.49** -1.43* 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
Performance above aspiration 0.39 0.37 0.32 -0.10 0.32 -0.05 
 (1.21) (1.21) (1.21) (1.23) (1.21) (1.23) 
Foreign competition 3.77* 3.87* 3.89** 3.82* 3.81* 3.80* 
 (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.51) (1.50) 
Industry concentration -0.25 -0.26 -0.26+ -0.26+ -0.27+ -0.27+ 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Industry growth -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.24+ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
OFDI in developed country (H1)  0.10+ 0.15+ 0.07 0.01 0.04 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) 
OFDI in developed country (H2a)   -1.39*   -1.02 
×Performance below aspiration    (0.69)   (0.95) 
OFDI in developed country (H2b)    3.07*  2.24 
×Performance above aspiration    (1.55)  (1.65) 
OFDI in developed country (H3)     0.15** 0.11* 
×Industry concentration     (0.05) (0.05) 
_cons -17.56*** -17.48*** -17.47*** -17.41*** -17.43*** -17.39*** 
 (1.64) (1.55) (1.53) (1.57) (1.55) (1.54) 
N 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 
ll -6933.0 -6931.4 -6930.3 -6930.3 -6930.7 -6929.3 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Table 27: Supplementary Analysis-Effects on patent quality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Firm size 0.0823*** 0.0811*** 0.0811*** 0.0810*** 0.0810*** 0.0810*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
Firm age -0.0061** -0.0061** -0.0061** -0.0061** -0.0061** -0.0061** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Product diversification -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.0096 -0.0097 -0.0098 -0.0095 
 (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) 
Technological capability -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Slack resource 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
State ownership 0.0186 0.0202 0.0205 0.0204 0.0204 0.0207 
 (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0294) 
IJV experience -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Foreign experience 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Previous innovation quality 0.182*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
Board size 0.0035 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
CEO duality -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
Ownership concentration -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Performance below aspiration  -0.0799 -0.0819 -0.0768 -0.0820 -0.0816 -0.0768 
 (0.0690) (0.0691) (0.0692) (0.0691) (0.0691) (0.0692) 
Performance above aspiration 0.201 0.198 0.194 0.188 0.197 0.192 
 (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
Foreign competition 0.651** 0.655** 0.653** 0.655** 0.649** 0.648** 
 (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.227) (0.227) 
Industry concentration -0.0353 -0.0346 -0.0348 -0.0348 -0.0357 -0.0358 
 (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0228) 
Industry growth 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.0380+ 0.0383+ 0.0383+ 0.0385+ 0.0384+ 0.0383+ 
 (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) 
OFDI in developed country (H1)  0.0037+ 0.0061* 0.0031 0.0029 0.0051 
  (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0039) 
OFDI in developed country (H2a)   -0.058   -0.0553 
×Performance below aspiration    (0.0429)   (0.0466) 
OFDI in developed country (H2b)    0.0454  0.0074 
×Performance above aspiration    (0.0698)  (0.0762) 
OFDI in developed country (H3)     0.0015 0.0012 
×Industry concentration     (0.0034) (0.0034) 
_cons -1.727*** -1.703*** -1.701*** -1.701*** -1.700*** -1.699*** 
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) 
N 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Table 28: Supplementary Analysis-Effects of OFDI in developing countries 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Firm size 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Firm age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Product diversification -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Technological capability -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Slack resource 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
State ownership 0.34* 0.34* 0.34* 0.35* 0.34* 0.35* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
IJV experience -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Foreign experience 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Previous innovation quality 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Board size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CEO duality 0.18* 0.14* 0.18* 0.19* 0.18* 0.18* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ownership concentration -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Performance below aspiration  -1.55** -1.55** -1.56** -1.56** -1.56** -1.56** 
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.60) (0.59) (0.60) (0.60) 
Performance above aspiration 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.31 
 (1.21) (1.22) (1.22) (1.22) (1.21) (1.22) 
Foreign competition 3.77* 3.81* 3.81* 3.79* 3.81* 3.79* 
 (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) 
Industry concentration -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Industry growth -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.24+ 0.25+ 0.25+ 0.25+ 0.25+ 0.25+ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
OFDI in developing country (H1)  -0.003*** -0.004 -0.003*** 0.01 0.004 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.02) (0.01) 
OFDI in developing country (H2a)   0.03   0.04 
×Performance below aspiration    (0.08)   (0.08) 
OFDI in developing country (H2b)    0.13  0.15 
×Performance above aspiration    (0.08)  (0.09) 
OFDI in developing country (H3)     -0.01 -0.01 
×Industry concentration     (0.02) (0.02) 
_cons -17.56*** -17.64*** -17.65*** -17.63*** -17.63*** -17.63*** 
 (1.64) (1.70) (1.73) (1.69) (1.73) (1.75) 
N 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 5315 
ll -6933.0 -6932.6 -6932.5 -6932.4 -6932.5 -6932.3 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, based on a Huber-White sandwich estimator 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




5.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
Based on the empirical context of 638 Chinese listed firms in manufacturing industries 
between 2002 and 2010, I find that outward FDI in developed countries could improve 
firms’ innovation outputs. Moreover, for Chinese MNEs in developed countries, 
performance below and deviates from aspiration levels will decrease the influence of 
OFDI on innovation output. Also, firms from industries with higher competitions in 
their home market could better and have a higher motivation to search and absorb the 
strategic assets, in turn, improve their innovation outputs in the home country.  
 This study makes three important contributions to the Chinese firms’ outward FDI 
and innovation research in China. First, while previous studies focused primarily on 
inward FDI spillover benefits in terms of productivity improvement and new production 
introduction of local firms (Li et al., 2010, 2013; Meyer & Sinani, 2009), my study 
target to examine the effects of a new method to acquire knowledge and improve firms’ 
innovative capabilities, outward FDI, on firms’ innovation. Specifically, I find strong 
evidence of benefits of outward FDI in developed markets for firms’ innovation. This 
finding lends support to my arguments that outward FDI is an active learning method 
for Chinese MNEs. Moreover, this study further proves that Chinese MNEs use outward 
FDI as a springboard strategy to acquire strategic-assets in developed markets (Luo & 
Tung, 2007).  
 Second, I also find evidence of contingency effects of performance relative to 
aspirations. Different from the direct effects of performance relative to aspirations on 
firms’ R&D investment and innovation outputs in advanced markets (Chen, 2008; Chen 
& Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a), it moderates the relationship between Chinese firms’ 
outward FDI and innovation outputs.  
 Another finding reveals that industry competition in the home country also 
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facilitates Chinese MNEs’ learning in outward FDI and further influence their 
innovation outputs. Traditional industrial organization thinking emphasizes that a firm’ 
strategy and performance depends on the conditions within a given industry (Porter, 
1990). The increasing competitive pressure acted as a selection mechanism. Firms that 
were more efficient became even stronger and were able to compete in global markets. 
Also, firms in the industry with higher competition have the motivation to further 
improve their competitive advantages to achieve a better status in industry competition. 
 Finally, this study contributes to the innovation empirical analysis in China. This is 
the first study to match the Chinese firms’ outward FDI with their patent data and 
analyze their relationship. Different from previous studies mostly focused on aggregate 
data on Chinese patent, this study moves one step forward to analyze the patent 
application at the firm level and analyze firm-level effects on their innovation outputs. 
Moreover, this study tries to use the IPC class to measure the quality of patent and to 
remedy the limitation of Chinese patent data without citation information.  
 This study has several important limitations, which also provide opportunities for 
future research. First, to better capture the quality of patent by Chinese firms, future 
studies could attempt to match Chinese firms with their patent application in USPTO. 
As Chinese firms go global, they will also apply for patent protection in foreign markets 
for their valuable patents. This is another method to measure the quality of patent as 
Chinese firms will apply for the patent application for their most valuable inventions in 
advanced markets like USPTO. Second, as appropriate measures of absorptive capacity 
become available, future studies might examine how the absorptive capacity of Chinese 





CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE RESULTS 
6.1 Major Findings 
The main objective of this dissertation is to study multinational enterprises from 
emerging market. This dissertation extends previous research by addressing two related 
questions: (1) How performance relative to aspirations affect Chinese firms’ OFDI 
decisions? (2) How such OFDI decisions further influence firms’ innovation in home 
country?  
 Theoretically, the first essay models the antecedents of Chinese firms’ outward FDI 
from the behavioral theory of the firm perspective, while the second essay explores the 
consequences of outward FDI regarding their innovation outputs in the home country 
based on organizational learning. Empirically, I use Chinese listed firms in 
manufacturing industries during 2002 to 2010 to analyze the underlying relationships. 
Table 29 summarizes the empirical results of the hypotheses in this dissertation. Overall, 
the results provide reasonable support for the hypotheses.   
 While the current literature on the antecedents of Chinese firms’ 
internationalization has largely drawn on the resource-based view, institutional theory, 
and industrial organizations, I consider the drivers from the behavioral theory of the 
firm perspective in Essay 1. I investigate behavioral explanations for the Chinese firms’ 
OFDI by focusing on the effects of performance relative to aspiration level and extend 
the model of decision making to a competitive context to develop a theory about how 
foreign competition in domestic markets affects firms’ decision making. 
For firms performing above aspirations, I propose that the extent of firms’ outward 
FDI increases following slack search argument. For firms performing below aspirations, 
outward FDI was not their matched solution for performance problem which is not 
consistent with the problemistic search. However, foreign competition increases their 
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probability to do a problemistic search through OFDI by affecting their resource 
allocation and focus of attention. 
The outcome of Chinese firms’ outward FDI is another focus of this dissertation in 
Essay 2. I analyze the relationship between firms’ OFDI in the developed country and 
their innovation in the home market and theorize positive relationship for firms 
investing in developed markets. I show that firms’ innovation outputs increase as they 
invested in developed markets. The results further provide support for the argument that 
Chinese MNEs use outward FDI as a springboard strategy to acquire strategic assets in 
advanced markets (Luo & Tung, 2007). Also, I find that performance relative to 
aspiration and industry competition moderating these relationships. Specifically, for 
firms performing below aspirations, as performance decreases, the benefits of outward 
FDI in developed countries on the innovation outputs decrease. Firms from industries 
with higher competitions in their home market could better and have higher motivation 
to search and absorb the strategic assets, in turn, improve their innovation outputs in 
the home country. In sum, the findings from these two essays have given empirical 
support for the hypotheses developed in this dissertation.  
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the extent of their 
OFDI? 
 
Hypothesis 1a: As firms’ performance falls below the aspiration level, the extent of firms’ outward 
FDI decreases. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1b: As firms’ performance increases above the aspiration level, the extent of firms’ 
outward FDI increases. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2: As the level of foreign competition in home markets increases, the extent of firms’ 
outward FDI increases. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3a: As firms’ performance falls below the aspiration level, the extent of firms’ outward 
FDI decreases less when there is higher foreign competition in home markets.  
Supported 
Hypothesis 3b: As firms’ performance increases above the aspiration level, the extent of firms’ 
outward FDI increases more when there is higher foreign competition in home markets.  
Not supported 
Essay 2: How does 
firms’ outward 
FDI influence their 
innovation output?  
 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese MNE’s outward FDI in developed markets positively affects its rate of 
launching innovations. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms’ performance relative to aspiration levels (below aspirations) negatively 
moderate the effect of outward FDI in developed markets on its rate of launching innovations. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms’ performance relative to aspiration levels (above aspirations) positively 
moderate the effect of outward FDI in developed countries on its rate of launching innovations. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the competition in an industry in the Chinese MNE’s home country, the 







6.2 Significance of the Study 
The importance of this study is its contribution by each of the two essays and the 
dissertation. Together with the rapid ascent of the Chinese economy, the globalization 
of Chinese enterprises has increased substantially. As China is trying to develop the 
world-class multinational enterprises with a full range of competencies (Alon & 
McIntyre, 2008), the globalization of Chinese firms has garnered increasing attention 
in the professional literature (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Zeng 
& Williamson, 2007). 
 This dissertation proposes that performance relative to aspirations is an important 
factor in determining Chinese firms’ outward FDI and for the extent to which a firm 
can benefit from the foreign knowledge. On the one hand, performance relative to 
aspirations influence firms’ decision to search, which further influence their decision 
on outward FDI. On the other hand, as emerging economy firms cannot simply 
introduce new technologies into their domestic market without modifications, firms’ 
performance relative to aspirations further influences their exposure to foreign 
knowledge and absorptive capacity to transfer this advanced knowledge to their 
innovations.  
 Second, this dissertation explores the importance of industry competition in their 
home country. From one perspective, foreign competition in domestic market could 
influence firms’ resource allocation and focus of attention. This will further increase 
their motivation to invest in foreign markets. From another perspective, fierce industry 
competition including both domestic and foreign firms could provide firms the 
motivation to search for a market and advanced knowledge to further increase their 
bargaining power and competitive advantages in the domestic markets.  
 Third, this dissertation further proposes the importance of the home market for 
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Chinese firms. Even though the internationalization of Chinese firms has increased 
substantially, the home market is always their first target and focus. Using international 
expansion as a springboard to counter-attack global rivals in their home country market 
and improve their innovative capabilities in the home country are a major purpose for 
Chinese firms. In other words, international expansion is an important method for 
Chinese firms to better serve their home markets. Access to a broad range of strategic 
assets is an important factor in improving Chinese MNEs’ capability. Building up their 
strength abroad offers the prospect of providing needed assets much faster and also of 
increasing the firms’ bargaining power against local stakeholders who are constantly 
acting to reduce their profitability. Furthermore, they may channel back advanced 
technology and resources to upgrade their domestic manufacturing and develop new 
products for international markets (Luo & Tung, 2007). As a learning process for 
Chinese MNEs, instead of consuming resources, international diversification could 
provide firms more strategic assets for their subsequent innovation.  
With the shift of research focus to Chinese MNEs, each of the two essays 
contributes to the literature in their ways. First, the first essay departs from the existing 
work that focuses on strategy tripod perspective on the Chinese MNEs to shift research 
attention toward the behavioral theory perspective. I propose that a theory of OFDI 
must include the factors that motivate decision makers to pursue major changes in 
corporate activities. Specifically, to address the determinant of OFDI, it is necessary to 
understand the perspective of managers situated within firms and what motivates them 
to initiate a search that eventuates in OFDI. 
Second, my approach of examining the interactive effect of foreign competition in 
the industry and performance relative to aspirations on search behavior is novel and 
sheds lights on previous studies of the effect of the performance gap. My results also 
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add to a small but growing body of work that seeks to incorporate the role of the 
organizational context in theories of organizational strategies. Researchers have noted 
that theories based solely on individual-level explanations offer unrealistic 
representations of how strategic decisions are made within organizations (March & 
Shapira, 1987). My study exemplifies a complementary approach by suggesting that an 
important feature of the organizational environment, such as foreign competition, can 
moderate the effect of performance on search behavior. 
Third, I contribute to the extant innovation literature, which has primarily focused 
on innovation of firm in the context of developed economies. I have drawn upon the 
organizational learning theory and latecomer literature to suggest that success to 
advanced knowledge in developed markets is critical for improving firm innovation in 
emerging markets. Also, different from existing studies that mainly use aggregate 
industry or regional data to analyze innovation outputs in China, my study is based on 






CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Directions for Future Research 
First, this study proposes the need for a behavioral understanding of OFDI activity in 
particular and corporate strategy in general. Overall, the empirical results indicate the 
potential of behavioral variables to add to researchers’ ability to explain 
internationalization decisions. Further research is necessary to explore more fully the 
applicability of behavioral theory to corporate phenomena. Also, for the international 
business area, future research could analyze if firms performing above or below 
aspirations might have different strategies in their foreign expansion like ownership 
strategy or location decisions. Also, even though this study is based on China, the results 
should have more general implications in other countries. Future studies could further 
test these effects in other developing or developed countries.  
Second, firms might engage in problemistic search based on forecasted future 
performance, and a study contrasting historical and forward-looking performance 
relative to aspirations could inform researchers as to whether managers tend to be 
retrospective or prospective when they initiate search and changes in strategy. The 
question of whether the change is problem-driven or opportunity-driven arose early in 
the research on the behavioral theory of the firm. This study provides an important step 
in examining the relevance of problem-driven search for corporate strategy. Future 
research could compare these two motivations---problems and opportunities---for 
changes in corporate strategy.  
 Third, differences in governance may induce different corporate behaviors in 
response to performance feedback. Firms with weak governance structures may differ 
from those with strong governance both in their propensities to engage in outward FDI 
and the types of outward FDI that they undertake. Behavioral variables may not only 
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affect managements’ motivation to change; they may also affect the strength of 
governance, which alters management’s discretion to make changes. For example, the 
stringency of the constraints that a firm’s board imposes on its managers may differ 
depending on the firm’s performance relative to aspirations or on whether the firm is 
threatened with bankruptcy. Future research could advance beyond my analyses by 
empirically testing the direct and governance-mediated effects of behavioral variables 
on corporate strategy like outward FDI decisions. Furthermore, the effects on 
shareholder value of corporate responses to performance feedback may differ 
depending on firms’ behavioral motivations and governance structures. A key issue for 
future research is whether managers responding to performance feedback make value-
enhancing investment decisions. I encourage research examining governance as a 
moderator of behavioral explanations for corporate strategic changes and their 
performance implications.  
Fourth, this study examines how outward FDI provides knowledge acquisition 
opportunities and contributes to innovation by firms in emerging markets. Also, future 
research with more comprehensive dataset could compare the effectiveness of different 
channels for obtaining foreign knowledge and, thus, provide more meaningful 
suggestions for firms that intend to improve their innovative capabilities. More 
interestingly, future research could investigate other types of internal efforts that 
improve firms’ ability to absorb foreign knowledge and develop their innovative 
capabilities. Also, one could extend the current study to other emerging economies, 
such as Indian, to examine the external validity of the main findings.  
 Fifth, as the globalization of emerging economy firms and the ‘flattening’ of the 
world, poor, emerging markets no longer just borrow innovations from developed 
countries; from time to time they also contribute to innovations to the rest of the world, 
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including developed countries. This is reverse innovation proposed in the literature. 
Even though the cases of reverse innovation are still rare, as the emerging market firms’ 
innovative capabilities improve, this is a promising area for future research.  
 
7.2 Conclusion 
Child and Rodrigues (2005) argued that instead of developing competitive advantages, 
Chinese firms expand internationally for the sake of overcoming competitive 
disadvantages that result from operating exclusively in domestic markets. Using a 
unique dataset of Chinese listed firms, I provide new conceptual and empirical insights 
into the internationalization of firms from large emerging economies. Specifically, I 
examine the determinant of outward FDI by Chinese firms by looking at their 
performance relative to aspiration levels, and foreign competition in the industries in 
their home market. Furthermore, I explore the outcome of Chinese firms’ outward FDI 
with a specific focus on their innovation in the home country. The theoretical 
frameworks developed in this dissertation and the empirical findings presented in the 
two essays will have substantial implications for the research in internationalization, 
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